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xABSTRACT
Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), e.g., Snort, Bro or NSM, try to detect
malicious network activity such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and port scans by monitoring
network traffic. Research from network traffic measurement has identified various patterns
that exploits on today’s Internet typically exhibit. However, there has not been any significant
attempt, so far, to design algorithms with provable guarantees for detecting exploit patterns
from network traffic packets. In this work, we develop and apply data streaming algorithms to
detect exploit patterns from network packet streams.
In network intrusion detection, it is necessary to analyze large volumes of data in an on-
line fashion. Our work addresses scalable analysis of data under the following situations. (1)
Attack traffic can be stealthy in nature, which means detecting a few covert attackers might
call for checking traffic logs of days or even months, (2) Traffic is multidimensional and correla-
tions between multiple dimensions maybe important, and (3) Sometimes traffic from multiple
sources may need to be analyzed in a combined manner. Our algorithms offer provable bounds
on resource consumption and approximation error. Our theoretical results are supported by
experiments over real network traces and synthetic datasets.
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1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a piece of software or hardware designed to detect
unwanted attempts at accessing, manipulating and disabling of computer systems through a
network such as the Internet. An Intrusion Detection System can be network-based, protocol-
based or host-based. Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS), e.g., Snort [99], Bro
[95] or NSM [67], try to detect malicious activity such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [91],
port scans [102] or even attempts to gain acess to computers by monitoring network traffic.
The network traffic measurement researchers have identified various patterns that the typical
exploits on today’s Internet (e.g., DoS attacks, port scans, worms) exhibit [113, 114]. However,
there has not been any significant attempt, so far, to design algorithms - with theoretical
guarantees on the space and/or time requirement, or the extent of approximation - for detecting
these known exploit patterns from network traffic packet data and applying them in NIDSs.
We observe that data stream algorithms, which compute various aggregates from massive data
streams online and in small space, can be applied to detect such exploit patterns from network
packet data. The goals of this research are (1) formalization of the notion of exploit patterns
and (2) design and analysis of efficient algorithms for detecting these patterns from network
packet streams.
1.1 Challenges in Network Monitoring
The Internet consists of routers connected to each other that forward IP packets. Traffic at
the routers may be viewed at several levels of abstraction [93, 56].
1. Packet logs: Each TCP segment (or UDP datagram) has a header that has source and
destination ports, and the IP packet that the TCP segment (or UDP datagram) envelops
2contains the source and destination IP addresses in its header. This can be collected at
switches, routers or network taps by tools like tcpdump [1] or wireshark [2].
2. Flow logs: Each flow is a collection of packets with same values for certain key attributes
such as the source and destination IP addresses. For each flow, the log contains cumulative
information about number of bytes and packets sent, start and end times, protocol types
etc. This is typically collected at border routers or taps by tools like FlowScan [96], YAF
[3] or Argus [4].
3. Traffic counters: A traffic counter keeps track of the number of bytes sent over each
link every few minutes. An example is MRTG logs [5], which record the volume of traffic
through SNMP-enabled devices.
It is most valuable to analyze flow logs and packet logs, because they contain maximum
information. However, this, at the same time, implies that we should be prepared to deal with
enormous volume of data. For example, the backbone of a typical regional ISP today is a
OC-192 network line with a transmission speed of 10 Gbits/sec, of which the packet overhead
part alone is 332 Mbits/s! Given the volume and the short-lived nature of this data, it is almost
impossible to store these data on a hard disk. Cisco routers that have IOS NetFlow [6] or
CS-MARS (Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System) [38] feature enabled
aggregate packets to flows and generate NetFlow records; these are exported to analyzing soft-
ware like NetFlow Collector (NFC) [7]. The potential devices where such monitoring algorithms
would be deployed are gateway routers (e.g., Cisco ASR 1000). Considering a typical Cisco
home router has 32-64 MB RAM and 4-8 MB Flash memory, and a typical desktop computer
(where a product like NetFlow Collector might be installed) or a gateway router has 6-8 GB
of RAM, none of these devices are able to store such network data streams in their entirety in
main memories. Any analysis on the data has to be performed online, i.e., accepting the fact
that we get to see each data item only once.
31.2 Data Streams: Model and Algorithms
A data stream is an abstract model for applications where data is generated continuously
(e.g., stock quotes, network flows, call records in a telephone exchange, high-energy particle
physics experiments).
Definition 1.2.1 A data stream A = (a1, a2, . . . , am) is a sequence of elements, where each ai
is a member of [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The sheer volume and transience of data streams forces us to perform any computation
on the data in a single pass and using limited memory. These constraints have motivated the
emergence of a class of data structures called sketches, defined as follows:
Definition 1.2.2 A sketch is a data structure with the following properties:
• Property 1.2.1 A sketch requires small space, typically polylogarithmic in the size of the
stream, or the size of a subset of the stream we are interested in
• Property 1.2.2 It can be updated, in constant or polylogarithmic time, as the elements
of the stream are received
• Property 1.2.3 The aggregate that we want to compute on the stream can be computed
approximately based on the sketch
• Property 1.2.4 Some applications, with distributed streams (to be defined later), re-
quires the following property: if a separate sketch is maintained for each of two or more
streams, then the combination of the sketches should be able to answer the desired aggre-
gate on the union of the streams, with guaranteed accuracy
A sketch can be a simple uniform or weighted random sample of the stream elements,
or a projection along random vectors, or any other transformation that satisfies the above
properties.
We now present some basic research findings in data streams. Let mi = |{j : aj = i}|
denote the number of occurrences of i in the sequence A. For each k > 0, a useful statistics of
4the sequence is the kth frequency moment, defined as Fk =
∑n
i=1m
k
i . In particular, F0 is the
number of distinct elements in the sequence, F1(= m) is the length of the sequence, and F2 is
known as the “surprise index”.
In a seminal work, Alon et al [13] analyzed the space complexity of computing the frequency
moments. They presented lower bounds showing that an exact computation of Fk, or even an
accurate deterministic approximation of it, requires Ω(n) space, in the worst case. However, a
randomized approximation to Fk (for k ≥ 2) can be found as follows. First, choose a random
element ap from A. Then maintain the count X = |{q : q ≥ p, aq = ap}|. In other words, count
the number of reoccurrences of the element ap in the portion of the stream that succeeds ap
(including ap). Then, the random variable Y = m[Xk − (X − 1)k] is an unbiased estimator
of Fk, i.e. E[Y ] = Fk. Further, it can also be shown that the variance of Y is small. This
approach is termed as “sample and count”, and we show, in Chapter 2, how a variant of this
approach can be used for a different problem. Alon et al [13] also proved that F0, F1 and F2
can be approximated in logarithmic space, whereas the approximation of Fk for k ≥ 6 requires
nΩ(1) space. Of these, the problem of estimating F0 has drawn significant attention of the
researchers, and has been addressed by Flajolet and Martin [51] and Gibbons and Tirthapura
[57].
The problem of identifying the frequently occurring items [34, 87, 89] (often termed “heavy-
hitters”) from a stream has also been studied quite thoroughly. For any user-input threshold
φ ∈ (0, 1), Misra and Gries [89] came up with a deterministic algorithm to find the data items
that occur more than φm times in an array of size m. Their algorithm required O(m log 1φ) time
and O( 1φ) space for the sketch. The problem with their algorithm was that it was two-pass - the
first pass could identify the candidates for frequent items, and kept track of the counts of these
elements; and in the second pass, one had to eliminate, from these candidates, the ones that
were not actually frequent. However, with minor modifications of the original algorithm, and
a little sacrifice in precision, it is possible to come up with a single-pass, approximate variant
of the algorithm that provides the following approximation guarantees, for some user-input
threshold φ and approximation error  < φ (note that for an online algorithm, m is the number
of elements received so far) :
5• All items whose frequencies exceed φm are output. There are no false negatives.
• No item with frequency less than (φ− )m is output.
• Estimated frequencies are less than true frequencies by at most m.
The algorithm is simple: it maintains an associative array (of size at most 1 ) of (value, count)
pairs. On receiving each item ai, we check whether the value ai is already in the associative
array. If it exists, we increment its count by 1; otherwise, we add the pair (ai, 1) to the
array. Now, if adding a new pair to the array makes its size exceed 1 , then for each of the
(value, count) pairs in the array, we decrement the count by one; and throw away any value
whose count falls to zero after decrement. Note that this ensures at least the element which
was most recently added (with a count of one) would get discarded, so the size of the array,
after processing all pairs, would come down to 1 or less. Thus, the space requirement of this
algorithm is O(1 ). In Chapter 3, we apply an extension of this idea to identify correlated
heavy-hitters from multidimensional streams.
In data stream applications, often, the more recent an item is, the more is our interest
in it. So, a popular model for studying data streams is the sliding-window model, where we
focus on computing the aggregates on the last N items of the stream, using o(N) space. Datar
et al [40] solved the basic counting problem in the sliding-window model: given a stream of
bits, they came up with an -approximate algorithm for counting the number of 1’s among the
last N bits, using O(1 log
2N) bits of memory. Their algorithm processed each item in O(1)
amortized and O(logN) worst-case time. They also extended their algorithm to maintain the
sum of last N elements, with a relative error of at most , in a stream of positive integers in
the range [0. . .R]. This algorithm needed O(1 (logN +logR)(logN)) memory bits. The arrival
of each new element was processed in O( logNlogR ) amortized time and O(logN + logR) worst-
case time. Gibbons and Tirthapura [58] came up with improved results for the same problem,
using a novel data structure called the wave. For the basic counting problem, they improved
the per-item processing time to O(1) in worst case. For the sum problem, they improved the
worst-case per-item processing time to O(1). We use the sliding window model for a different
problem in Chapter 2.
6With the emergence of huge networks, today’s applications often collect data not from a
single source, but from distributed sources. In such a scenario, we are interested in computing
aggregates over the union of the streams emerging from different sources. As we have already
discussed, network monitoring devices observe streams of packets. Each device has a small
workspace in which to store information on its observed stream, and the contents are periodi-
cally sent to a central data analyzer, in order to compute aggregated statistics on the streams.
Some existing network monitoring tools, e.g., Lucent’s InterpretNet and some products imple-
menting Cisco’s NetFlow protocol, use this mechanism for traffic monitoring.
As Gibbons and Tirthapura [57] pointed out, there is a subtle difference between the dis-
tributed streams model and the merged streams model. In the latter model, there is only one
party who observes both streams, and the streams are interleaved in an arbitrary order by an
adversary. In the distributed streams model, each party observes its own stream, and com-
putes the sketch on it. The sketches have the property that when combined, they can give
approximate answers to queries over the unions of all the streams. Gibbons and Tirthapura
[57] showed that for t > 2 streams and for any function f , the deterministic merged stream
complexity (i.e., space bound) is within a factor of t of the deterministic t-party distributed
stream complexity. It followed that deterministic merged streams algorithms can be designed
assuming that the streams are not interleaved, at a penalty of at most t.
Our study of the intrusion detection literature reveals that most of the signature-based
NIDS tools (e.g. Snort [99]), work by checking the packet payloads for signatures of well-
known attacks. This is not a very scalable method as the attacker can evade detection with
minor changes in the signature, but can still amount the same damage to the victim. Also,
the signature set can grow very large, e.g., the signature set of Snort contains 3,400 distinct
signatures. Matching these signatures sequentially with the packet payload is very expensive.
Among the anomaly-based intrusion detection tools, PAYL [111] compares the frequency dis-
tributions byte contents of training and test datasets to detect anomalous payloads. However,
Kolesnikov and Lee [76] and Fogla et al [52] showed that detection by PAYL and other anomaly
detection systems ([77, 104]) could be evaded by specially-crafted polymorphic blending attacks.
Moreover, none of these approaches paid much attention to the scalability issue.
7We found that in the area of network traffic measurement, there has been systematic study
of real network traffic data to identify various patterns of the typical exploits on today’s Internet
(e.g., DoS attacks, port scans, worms) [113, 114, 115]. Xu et al [113, 114] applied data mining
and information-theoretic techniques to automatically extract useful information from largely
unstructured data. This shows that exploit patterns can be detected by computing summary
statistics over large volumes of data, rather than inspecting the payload of each and every
packet for an exact or partial signature match. We observed that DoS attacks [91] and port
scans [102] are two types of attacks on the Internet where data-driven approaches can play
major roles in identifying potential threats, and hence discuss them in detail in the following
sections.
1.3 Denial of Service attacks
A DoS attack is an attempt to make a computer resource (e.g., a website or a database
server) unavailable to its intended users. The methods generally involve saturating the target
machine with external communications requests, such that it cannot respond to legitimate
traffic, or responds so slowly as to be rendered effectively unavailable; or, saturating some
other resource, such as a system buffer.
In February 2000, a series of massive DoS attacks incapacitated several high-visibility Inter-
net e-commerce sites, including Yahoo, Ebay, and E*trade. Next, in January 2001, the name
server infrastructure of Microsoft was disabled by a similar assault. Many other domestic and
foreign sites have also been victims, ranging from smaller commercial sites, to educational insti-
tutions, public chat servers and government organizations. Moore et al [91] monitored a lightly
utilized network, comprising 224 distinct IP addresses, over a period of 25 days in February
2001, and observed 12,805 attacks on over 5,000 distinct Internet hosts belonging to more than
2,000 different organizations during this period. The following few types of DoS attacks are
most common:
SYN Flood: This is perhaps the most common and widely studied form of DoS attack.
When a client attempts to start a TCP connection to a server, the client and server exchange
a series of messages which normally runs like this:
81. The client requests a connection by sending a SYN (synchronize) message to the server.
2. The server acknowledges this request by sending SYN-ACK back to the client.
3. The client responds with an ACK, and the connection is established.
This is called the TCP three-way handshake, and is the foundation for every connection estab-
lished using the TCP protocol. The SYN Flood attack works if a server allocates resources for
the connection after receiving a SYN, but before it has received the ACK. The basic mechanism
to launch a SYN flood is the following: if half-open connections bind resources on the server, it
may be possible to take up all these resources by flooding the server with SYN messages. Once
all resources set aside for half-open connections are reserved, no new connections (legitimate
or not) can be made, resulting in denial of service. There are the two following methods to
launch a SYN flood attack - both involve the server not receiving the ACK.
• A malicious client can skip sending this last ACK message.
• By falsifying the source IP address in the SYN, it can make the server send the SYN-ACK
to the falsified IP address, and thus never receive the ACK.
UDP Flood: A UDP flood attack can be initiated by sending a large number of UDP packets
to random ports on a remote host. Since the target host finds (with high probability) that
no application is listening at that port, it replies with an “ICMP Destination Unreachable”
packet. Thus, for a large number of UDP packets, the victim host is forced to send many
ICMP packets, eventually leading it to be unreachable by other clients.
There are some other forms of DoS attacks (e.g., Smurf attack, Ping flood), the underlying
idea behind all of them being the same: the attacker pretends to be a benign host, and initiates
some form of communication request with the victim, the scale of the communication being
large enough to eventually exhaust all the system resources of the victim. A variant of DoS
attacks worth mention here is the Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack, where instead of a single
attacker, multiple compromised systems flood the bandwidth or resources of a targeted system.
The attack can be initiated by a single attacker, who compromises other systems to launch
an attack on the end victim(s) on a large scale. Note that if we treat the traffic flow of a
9single compromised system as a data stream, then the distributed streams model [57, 58] can
be useful in mining patterns from the union of these streams.
A DoS attack, or at least an attempt to launch one, can be detected by applying heavy-hitter
algorithms on traffic flow data. Where the frequent sources can be the potential attackers, the
frequent destinations can be the potential victims. In Chapter 3, we discuss our work on an
extension of the heavy-hitter problem [81] to design more informative sketches for detecting
the attackers and victims in a DoS attack under certain conditions. In Chapter 4, we discuss
some sketches we developed [80, 82] for identifying heavy-hitters from the union of multiple
data streams, which can be used for detecting DDoS attacks.
1.4 Port Scans
Some applications, running on specific ports, have some known vulnerabilities, and some-
times the network-based exploits take advantage of these vulnerabilities. The exploit traffic is
hence directed towards this port, e.g., the W32/Blaster worm took advantage of a buffer over-
flow in the Microsoft DCOM RPC locator service, an application that runs on TCP port 135,
to create a SYN flood. Port scanning is a technique to search a network host for open ports,
i.e., ports where a deployed application with known vulnerabilities is looking for an incoming
connection.
Jung et al [69] pointed out that a number of difficulties arise when we attempt to formulate
an effective algorithm for detecting port scans. The first is that there is no crisp definition of
the activity, e.g., an attempted HTTP connection to the main web server of a site should not
raise an alarm. However, whether a sweep through the entire address space looking for HTTP
servers should concern us depends on what intent the sweep is being done with, e.g., some
search engines not only follow embedded links but also scan ports in order to find web servers
to index. In addition, some applications (e.g., SSH, some P2P and Windows applications) have
modes in which they scan in a benign attempt to gather information or locate servers. Ideally,
we would like to separate out such benign use from overtly malicious one. We would note,
however, that the question of whether scanning by search engines is benign will ultimately be
a policy decision that will reflect the sites view of the desirability to have information about its
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servers publicly accessible.
Since we never know whether the intent behind a port scan is harmful or not, being able
to detect port scans is important from a security perspective. If we are allowed to make mul-
tiple passes over data gathered from packet/flow logs, then port scans can surely be detected.
However, detecting them online and using small space presents the usual challenge of network
monitoring.
We present a classification of port scans from [102]:
1. Vertical Scan: A sequential or random scan of multiple ports of a single IP address
from the same source in a given time window. These are usually an attempt to survey
which of several well known vulnerabilities applies to this host.
2. Horizontal Scan: A scan from a single source of several machines in a subnet aimed at
the same target port, i.e., the same vulnerability. In this case the attacker is searching for
any machine that is running specific service and does not care about any single machine
in particular.
Just like DoS attacks can be distributed ones, horizontal or vertical port scans can also be
launched by multiple sources working in tandem (sometimes referred to as “Coordinated Scans”
in the literature). However, horizontal or vertical port scans can be easily detected oﬄine from
packet/flow logs, unless the scan is a stealth scan. A stealth scan is initiated with a very low
frequency to avoid detection. The key parameters in the definition of stealth scan include the
maximum threshold and the minimum threshold for the average interscan distance. An average
interscan distance below the minimum threshold indicates that the scan was not stealthy, i.e.,
not intended to evade NIDS systems. Two successive scans from the same source that are
separated by more than the maximum interscan distance are considered to be unrelated or
parts of different scanning episodes. We will discuss in Chapter 2 how we can formalize the
notion of “persistence” [79] of data items to detect sources that launch stealthy port scans.
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1.5 NIDS: The Current State of the Art
Having discussed two major exploit patterns, DoS attacks and port scans, we now move
on to discuss some of the measures that have been adopted so far to address these problems.
Traditionally, intrusion detection tools are classified into two broad categories: signature-based
and anomaly-based [66]. Signature-based NIDSs aim to detect well-known attacks as well as
slight variations of them, by identifying the signatures that characterize these attacks. Due to
its nature, a signature-based NIDS has low false positives but it is unable to detect any attacks
that lie beyond its knowledge. An anomaly-based NIDS is designed to capture any deviations
from the established profiles of users and the normal behavior patterns of systems. Although
in principle, anomaly detection has the ability to detect new attacks, in practice this is far from
easy. Anomaly detection has the potential to generate too many false alarms, and it is very
time consuming and labor-expensive to sift true intrusions from the false alarms.
Historically, most signature-based NIDS tools function by detecting N or more events in
a time window of T seconds. Network Security Monitor (NSM) [67] was the first NIDS to
work on such algorithm. It had rules to detect any source IP address connecting to more than
15 distinct destination IP addresses within a given time window. Similarly, Snort [99], a tool
developed later by Martin Roesch, checks whether a given source IP address connected to more
than X number of ports or more than Y number of destination IP addresses within Z seconds,
where X, Y, Z are configurable parameters. However, Bro [95], another popular NIDS, worked
on the observation that failed connection attempts are better indicators for identifying port
scans. Since scanners have little knowledge of network topology and system configuration, they
are likely to often choose an IP address or port that is not active. The algorithm provided
by Bro treated connections differently depending on their services (application protocols). For
connections using a service specified in a configurable list (e.g., HTTP, SSH, SMTP etc), Bro
only performs bookkeeping if the connection attempt failed (was either unanswered, or elicited
a TCP RST response). For others, it considers all connections, whether or not they failed. It
then tallies the number of distinct destination addresses to which such connections (attempts)
were made. If the number reaches a configurable parameter N , then Bro flags the source
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address as a scanner.
The developers of the NIDS tools focussed on building full-fledged applications that can
monitor network traffic, generate logs and report incidents (the definition of “incident” depends
on the policy of the user, and is configurable within the tool). While these tools are lightweight
and (mostly) open-source, and some detailed documentation regarding their technical archi-
tectures are available [46], it seems that the overall approach is not very scalable. Most NIDSs
look for an exact match for a signature, which is a sequence of bytes, in the payloads of pack-
ets. However, when using tight signatures, the matcher has no capability to detect attacks
other than those for which it has explicit signatures; the matcher will in general completely
miss novel attacks, which, unfortunately, continue to be developed at a brisk pace. Also, the
total number of patterns contained in the signature set of a NIDS can be quite large, hence
matching them sequentially is time-wise expensive. Although Gonzalez and Paxson [61] came
up with some sampling-based modifications of Bro to identify the heavy-hitters from the traffic
streams, there is no published literature on their algorithms with theoretical guarantees, and
there is certainly scope for identifying more such aggregates from traffic streams. Gu et al [63]
attempted to create a comprehensive information-theoretic framework for analyzing intrusion
detection systems, but even their work does not address the computational resource issues like
memory or CPU time, unlike our work.
1.6 Thesis Contributions
There is no silver-bullet solution to network intrusion detection, and we do not claim that
our algorithms can be immediately converted to ready-to-deploy network monitoring tools.
Lately, there have been significant attempts to apply machine learning algorithms, particularly
classification techniques, to identify network traffic as benign or harmful. Recently, Sommer
and Paxson [101] did a comprehensive critique of the machine-learning based approaches in the
network intrusion detection domain; one of their main arguments was that machine-learning
algorithms are more effective in classifying objects based on “learning” from past (labeled)
data, rather than identifying outliers, as the anomaly detection systems need [8].
We focus on detecting a set of patterns from network packet streams that have repeatedly
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been shown to be characteristic of network intrusions, or attempts thereof. The major limi-
tations of the current NIDSs are that while signature-based systems fail to detect unforeseen
attacks, anomaly-based systems are very likely to generate false alarms. However, even a low
false positive rate can make an NIDS ineffective [18], while undetected attacks can cause major
damage to a network. Also, as Axelsson [18] pointed out, applying a classification-based ap-
proach for the intrusion detection problem is hard because of the base-rate fallacy - the number
of packets that contain traffic from malicious sources is typically a very small fraction of the
number of packets observed in a monitor over a given period of time.
The common theme underlying the work presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are the following:
• While most of the research in intrusion detection focused on improving precision and
recall, our work in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 address the challenges presented by limitation
of computational resources (memory, CPU time). They also mathematically establish
the trade-off between the amount of resource (mostly memory) used and the accuracy of
results. Usually, both the precision and the recall improve as the space budget is increased,
unlike many machine learning applications where there is a trafe-off involved between the
precision and the recall [14].
• In network intrusion detection, scalability can be an important issue because of the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) attack traffic can be stealthy in nature, which means detecting a few
covert attackers might call for checking traffic logs of days or even months, (2) we may
need to analyze the traffic data along multiple dimensions, or (3) we may need to analyze
the traffic data from multiple sources. We address those issues in Chapters 2, 3 and 4
respectively.
• Our algorithms (and data stream algorithms, in general) in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 offer
provable bounds on the probabilities of generating false positives and false negatives,
and/or the errors made in estimating quantities like frequency and temporal persistence.
We design space and/or communication-efficient algorithms for detecting such patterns
online; present lower-bound proofs, wherever appropriate, for showing some problems are in-
trinsically hard; and demonstrate the practical viability of our algorithms with experiments on
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real and synthetic datasets. While our motivation of working on these data stream problems
came from the network security domain, these are novel problems in the literature of streaming
algorithms; particularly, our work on persistent items in Chapter 2 shifts the focus from the
oft-discussed frequency distribution in streams to the temporal dynamics of items appearing in
a stream.
Here are the principal contributions of this thesis:
We formalize the notion of temporally persistent items occurring in a data stream. Unlike
frequent items or heavy-hitters which have drawn significant attention in data stream research,
persistent items do not necessarily contribute a lot to the volume of incoming traffic towards
a potential victim, since the attacker attempts to conduct the probe in the stealth mode.
However, the (source) IP address or port number of the attacker has to show up in a sufficiently
large number of distinct timeslots in order for the attack to be effective. We call such items (IP
addresses or port numbers) as “temporally persistent”. Our contributions are: (1) We show
that any algorithm that tracks all temporally persistent items in the stream must take space
superlinear in the number of distinct items, which is prohibitively expensive. (2) We design a
“sketch”, a hash-based technique of creating a summary of the data stream, to approximately
identify persistent items from an entire stream (“fixed window”). (3) We also extend the sketch
for an alternative model where the persistent items are tracked over a sliding window of recent
timeslots, and this sketch takes space that is (on expectation) within a factor of two of that
taken by the sketch for the fixed window version. Both sketches detect all persistent items with
high probability, and do not report any items, provably, whose persistence fall below a threshold.
(4) We experimented with three different datasets (one real and two synthetic) to see how the
accuarcy and memory footprint of the algorithm varies with the skewness of the dataset. Our
algorithms performed best for the two datasets out of three which had highest skewness of
persistence and lowest mean persistence. (5) Our experiments also show that typically the
persistence of IP addresses in real network traffic traces have a very skewed distribution, which
works to the advantage of our algorithm since we save space at the cost of not storing items
with very low persistence.
We consider online mining of correlated heavy-hitters (CHH) from a data stream, i.e.,
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queries of the following form: “In a stream S of (x, y) tuples, on the substream H of all x
values that are heavy-hitters, maintain those y values that occur frequently with the x values
in H”. In intrusion detection, this sort of query will be useful in multidimensional analytics of
the attack traffic, e.g., in a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, while the frequent sources detected
at a large ISP backbone router (like the Cisco 12000 Series [9]) may identify the attackers, the
frequent destinations in the sub-stream of a single attacker may identify the potential victims.
We advance the state of the art by (1) formulating an approximate version of the CHH problem,
(2) designing a sketch for approximately tracking of CHHs, with provable guarantees on the
maximum error estimates, (3) theoretically deriving the minimum space requirement for our
sketch under constraints imposed by our problem formulation, and (4) conducting experiments
that demonstrate the space-accuracy trade-off on a large stream of IP packet headers from a
backbone network link.
We present algorithms for identifying frequently occurring items in a large distributed data
set. In the parlance of network exploit pattern detection, this will be useful if a group of
coordinated attackers send a lot of traffic to a victim to launch a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack. The IP address of the victim may not be frequent in the packet stream
coming from a single source, but may be frequent if the union of the packet streams from
all the sources are considered. However, sending all packet streams to a central aggregator
is neither a scalable nor a fault-tolerant solution. (1) Our algorithms use gossip [42] as the
underlying communication mechanism, since gossip does not rely on any central control, or
on an underlying network structure, such as a spanning tree. If this process continues for a
(short) period of time, the desired results are computed, with probabilistic guarantees on the
accuracy. (2) Our algorithm for identifying frequent items is built by layering a novel small-
space “sketch” of data over a gossip-based data dissemination mechanism. We prove that the
algorithm identifies the frequent items with high probability, and provide bounds on the time
till convergence. (3) We experiment with our algorithms on two different synthetic datasets,
generated from different distributions, to show that both the sketch size and the number of
rounds of gossip needed till convergence, can in practice be kept orders of magnitude lower
than what the theoretical analyses demand.
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CHAPTER 2. Space-Efficient Tracking of Persistent Items in a Massive
Data Stream
Motivated by scenarios in network anomaly detection, in this chapter, we consider the
problem of detecting persistent items in a data stream, which are items that occur “regularly”
in the stream. In contrast with heavy-hitters, persistent items do not necessarily contribute
significantly to the volume of a stream, and may escape detection by traditional volume-based
anomaly detectors.
We first show that any online algorithm that tracks persistent items exactly must necessarily
use a large workspace, and is infeasible to run on a traffic monitoring node. In light of this
lower bound, we introduce an approximate formulation of the problem and present a small-space
algorithm to approximately track persistent items over a large data stream. We experimented
with three different datasets to see how the accuracy and memory footprint of the algorithm
varies with the skewness of the dataset. Our algorithms performed best for the two datasets
out of three which had highest skewness of persistence and lowest mean persistence. To our
knowledge, this is the first systematic study of the problem of detecting persistent items in a
data stream, and our work can help detect anomalies that are temporal, rather than volume
based.
2.1 Introduction
We consider the problem of tracking persistent items in a large data stream. This problem
has particular relevance while mining various network streams, such as the traffic at a gateway
router, connections to a web service, etc. Informally, a persistent item is one that occurs
“regularly” in the stream.
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More precisely, suppose that the time at the stream processor is partitioned into non-
overlapping intervals called “timeslots”. Consider a stream of elements of the form (d, t) where
d is an item identifier, and t is a timeslot during which the item arrived. The t values are in
an increasing order within the stream. Multiple items can arrive in the same timeslot, and the
same item may arrive multiple times within a time slot. Suppose the total number of timeslots
in the stream is n. The persistence of an item d is defined to be the number of distinct timeslots
in which d was observed. The persistence of any item is an integer between 0 and n (inclusive).
An item is said to be α-persistent, for some constant 0 < α ≤ 1, if its persistence is at least αn.
Given a user-defined α, the problem is to output the set of α-persistent items in the stream.
Persistent items exhibit a repeated and regular pattern of arrival, and are significant for
many applications. Giroire et al. [59] monitored traffic from end-hosts to detect communication
across botnet channels. They observed that persistent destinations were likely to belong to one
of two classes: (1)either they were malicious hosts associated with a botnet, or (2)they were
frequently visited benign hosts. It was also observed that the latter set of hosts could be
identified easily and assembled into a “whitelist” of known good destinations. They found that
tracking persistent items in the network stream, followed by filtering out items contained in
the whitelist, resulted in reliable identification of botnet traffic.
More broadly, persistent items are often associated with specific anomalies in the context
of network streams: periodic connections to an online advertisement in a pay-per-click revenue
model [107] is an indicator of click fraud [117], repeated (failed) connections observed in the
stream is indicative of a failed or unreachable web service [64]; botnets periodically “phone
home” to their bot controllers [59]; attackers regularly scan for open ports on which vulnerable
applications are usually deployed [102]. While the narrative in this paper draws from applica-
tions in the network monitoring space, it appears that the problem of detecting persistent items
in a data stream is broadly applicable in other data monitoring applications. For example, per-
sistent use of gathering techniques such as telephone interception or satellite imaging might
indicate an “Advanced Persistent Threat” (APT) [105] for a target group, e.g., a government.
The persistent items in a stream could be very different from the frequently occurring items
(or “heavy-hitters”) in a stream. An item is called a φ-heavy hitter if it contributes to at
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least a φ fraction of the entire volume of the stream. There is a large body of literature on
heavy-hitter identification (including [89, 87, 50, 29, 33, 36]). A persistent item need not be
a heavy hitter. For example, the item may appear only once in each time slot and may not
contribute significantly to the stream volume. Such “stealthy” behavior was indeed observed in
botnet traffic detection [59]; the highly persistent destinations which were not contained in the
whitelist did not contribute in any meaningful way to the traffic volume. In fact, the traffic to
these destinations was stealthy and very low volume, perhaps by design to evade detection by
traditional volume-based detectors. Conversely, a heavy-hitter need not be a persistent item
either – for example, an item may occur a number of times in the stream, but all its occurrences
maybe within only a couple of timeslots. Such an item will have a low persistence. Clearly,
the set of persistent items in a stream can be very different from the set of heavy-hitters in
the stream; their intersection can very well be empty. There seems to be no easy reduction
from the problem of tracking persistent items to the problem of tracking heavy-hitters. For
example, one could attempt to devise a “filter” that eliminated duplicate occurrences of an
item within a time slot, and then apply a traditional heavy-hitter algorithm on the resulting
“filtered” stream. But this approach does not work in small space, because such a filter would
itself take space proportional to the number of distinct items that appeared within the timeslot,
and this number maybe very large, especially for the type of network traffic streams that we
are interested in.
A closely related problem is the problem of identifying heavy distinct hitters (HDHs) in a
data stream (Venkataraman et al.[110] and Bandi et. al. [20]). In the heavy distinct hitters
problem, we are given a stream S′ of (x, y) pairs, of length N . For a parameter β, 0 < β ≤ 1,
the set of β-HDHs in S′ is defined as the set of all those values of x that have occurred with
more than Nβ distinct values of y. There is a reduction from the problem of tracking persistent
items to that of identifying HDHs, as follows. Consider the identification of α-persistent items
on a stream S of (d, t) pairs, of length N . Let n denote the total number of timeslots in S.
Consider a stream S′ of (x, y) pairs where for each element (d, t) ∈ S, there is an element
(x = d, y = t) in S′. Then, the nαN -HDHs in S
′ are the set of α-persistent items in S. There are
two significant issues with using such a reduction for solving our problem using an algorithm
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(such as in [110, 20]) for HDH identification. (1)The first one is that for HDH identification, the
threshold nαN should be known beforehand. Though n, the number of timeslots is usually known
before the stream is observed, the number of packets N is not known beforehand, so the prior
algorithms for HDHs cannot be directly used. (2)Next, even if we were to modify the algorithms
for HDHs to work with an “adaptive threshold”, that can change as the number of elements
increases (which seems non-trivial), there is special structure in the data in the persistent items
identification problem that can be used here. In the heavy distinct hitter problem on a stream
of (x, y) values, there is no relative ordering required on the y values, and the same (x, y) tuple
can re-occur at arbitrary positions in the stream. But in the persistent items problem on a
stream of (d, t) tuples, the t values must be in a non-decreasing order (since they represent the
times of observation at the stream processor). An important consequence of this difference is
that the algorithms for HDH identification ([110, 20]) need to use “distinct counters” (such as
in [57, 51]) to count the number of distinct y values associated with each value of x. Hence, the
space complexity of their algorithms is the number of counters maintained multiplied by the
space taken by an (approximate) distinct counter. Approximate distinct counting is inherently
expensive space-wise, since it has been shown [68] that maintaining distinct counters with a
relative error of  requires Ω(1/2) space. Our algorithm does not need to use approximate
distinct counters, making it simpler, more efficient, and easier to implement.
Prior work in Giroire et al. [59] used the following method to track persistent items in a
stream of network traffic. For each distinct item in the stream, their method maintained (1)The
number of timeslots in which the item has appeared in the stream so far, and (2)Whether or
not the item has appeared in the current timeslot. This allowed them to exactly compute the
number of timeslots that each item has appeared in, and hence exactly track the set of persistent
items. However, the space taken by this scheme is proportional to the number of distinct items
in the stream. The stream could have a very large number of distinct items (for example, IP
sources, or destinations), and the memory overhead may render this infeasible on a typical
network monitor or a router. Thus the challenge is to track the persistent items in a stream
using a small workspace, and minimal processing per element. Further, all tracking must be
done online, and the system does not have the luxury of making multiple passes through the
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data.
2.1.1 Contributions
In this work, we present the first small-space approximation algorithm for tracking persistent
items in a data stream, and an evaluation of the algorithm. Our contributions are as follows.
Space Lower Bound: We first consider the problem of exactly tracking all α-persistent
items in a stream, for some user-defined α ∈ (0, 1]. For this problem, we show that any
algorithm that solves it must use Ω(|D| log nα) space, where |D| is the number of distinct items
in the stream, and n is the total number of slots, even when the number of persistent items is
much smaller than |D|.
Approximate Tracking of Persistent Items: In light of the above lower bound, we
define an approximate version of the problem. We are given two parameters, α - the threshold
for persistence, and  < α, an approximation (or “uncertainty”) parameter. The task is to
report a set of items with the following properties: every item that is α-persistent is reported,
and no item with persistence less than (α− ) is reported. We also formulate this problem for
a “sliding window” of the most recently observed items of the stream.
Small Space Algorithm: For the above problem of approximate tracking of persistent
items, we present a randomized algorithm that can approximately track the α-persistent items
using space that is typically much smaller than the number of distinct items in the stream. The
expected space complexity of the algorithm is O
(
P
n
)
, where P is the sum of the persistence
values of all items in the stream, and n is the total number of timeslots. The algorithm has a
small probability of a false negative (i.e. an α-persistent item is missed). This probability can
be made arbitrarily small, at the cost of additional space. Note that any algorithm will need
space that is at least as large as the size of the output, i.e., the number of α-persistent items in
the stream. The worst case scenario is when every item is α-persistent, forcing the algorithm
to use space proportional to the number of distinct items! Fortunately, this situation does not
seem to occur in practice and only a fraction of items are very persistent, and this helps our
algorithm considerably. We also prove that if persistence of different items in a stream follow
a power law distribution, then the space taken by our algorithm is O
(
1

)
.
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Sliding Windows: In most network monitoring applications, the data set of interest is
not the entire traffic stream, but only a window of the recent past (say, the n most recent
timeslots). For instance, Giroire et al [59] used this sliding window model in their work on
botnet traffic detection. Though the size of the data set has decreased when compared with
the fixed window case, maintaining statistics over a sliding window is still a hard problem, since
the data contained within a sliding window is often too large to be stored completely within
the memory of the stream processor. This is a harder problem than the fixed window, since it
has to deal with (old) elements falling off the window. We present an extension to our fixed
window algorithm to handle the sliding window model. Interestingly, the expected space cost
of our sliding window algorithm is within a factor of two of the space cost of the fixed window
algorithm.
Experimental Evaluation: We evaluate our algorithm against three datasets: a large,
real-world network traffic trace (which we call HeaderTrace) collected from an Internet back-
bone link, as well as two artifically created datasets, which we call Synthetic1 and Synthetic2
respectively, the latter having a skewness of persistence (17.17) which is three times that of
the former (5.67). In other words, Synthetic1 had a more uniform distribution of persistence
than Synthetic2 or HeaderTrace.
Our algorithm performed best on HeaderTrace and Synthetic2, and a little worse on
Synthetic1. On HeaderTrace, our small-space algorithm uses upto 85% less space than the
naive algorithm and typically incurs a false positive rate of less than 1% and a false negative
rate of less than 4%. We also see that false positive rate never exceeds 3% for any parameter
setting, while the false negative rate stays below 5% for all but the most aggressive thresholds
for persistence. For Synthetic2, which had a skewness about twice that of HeaderTrace, the
maximum FPR was 2.2%, the typical FNR being about 6%. The skewness of persistence for the
Synthetic1 dataset was about 60% of that of HeaderTrace (9.28). Although the maximum
FNR for Synthetic1 is 11.5% (the theoretical maximum FNR is 13%) and the maximum FPR
is 15.6%, the typical FNR and FPR are both within 4%. The comparative performance on the
three datasets shows that our algorithm in fact works better for datasets with high skewness
of peristence and low mean persistence, which is very typical of real-life network traffic.
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2.1.2 Roadmap
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A precise statement of the problem is presented
in Section 3.1.1, followed by a lower bound on the space cost of exactly tracking the persistent
items in a stream. Our algorithms for the fixed and sliding windows models are presented in
Section 2.3, followed by their analysis and correctness. Experimental results are described in
Section 2.4. A detailed discussion of related work is presented in Section 2.5.
2.2 Problem Definition
Consider a world where time is divided into timeslots (or slots) that are numbered 1, 2, . . ..
Let S be a stream of elements of the form S = 〈(d1, t1), (d2, t2), . . .〉. Each element is a tuple
(di, ti), where di is an item identifier (IP address, hostname, etc), and ti is the time slot during
which the element arrived. It is assumed that the tis are in non-decreasing order. All elements
that have the same values of ti are said to be in the same timeslot. Clearly, a timeslot consists
of elements that form a contiguous subsequence of the observed stream.
The duration of a timeslot depends on the application on hand. In the botnet detection
application [59], the duration of a timeslot was chosen to be between 1 hour and 24 hours,
primarily because these were suspected to be the possible lengths of time between successive
connections from the (infected) client to malicious destinations, for the botnets that they
considered. Since then, there have been other botnet attacks that work on a much smaller
timescale (see Section 2.4 for a discussion). In an eventual solution to botnet attack detection,
we may need to consider running the algorithm simultaneously with different timeslot durations,
to monitor multiple types of attacks.
We define a window Sr` to consist of all stream elements (di, ti) whose timeslots are in the
range [`, r], i.e. Sr` = {(di, ti) ∈ S|` ≤ ti ≤ r}. The size of window Sr` is defined as (r − `+ 1),
i.e. the number of timeslots it encompasses. For a given window we define the persistence of
an item in that window as follows:
Definition 2.2.1 The persistence of an item d over a window Sr` , denoted pd(`, r), is defined
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as the number of distinct slots in {`, `+ 1, . . . , r} that d appeared in.
pd(`, r) = |{t|((d, t) ∈ S) ∧ (` ≤ t ≤ r)}|
Definition 2.2.2 An item d is said to be α-persistent in window Sr` if pd(`, r) ≥ α(r− `+ 1).
In other words, d must have occurred in at least an α fraction of all slots within the window.
We state two versions of the problem, the first version for a fixed window, and the second
version for a sliding window. In practice, the sliding window version is more useful.
2.2.1 Exact Tracking of Persistent Items
Problem 1 Identifying Persistent Items Over a Fixed Window: Devise a space-efficient
algorithm that takes as input a prespecified window W = Sn1 and a persistence threshold α, and
at the end of observing the stream, returns the set of all items that are α-persistent. In other
words, the algorithm will report every item that is α-persistent in W and will not report any
item that is not α-persistent.
A straightforward algorithm for this problem would track every distinct item in the stream,
and for each distinct item, count the number of slots (from 0 to n − 1) during which the
item appeared. For a single item, its persistence can be tracked in a constant number of
bytes (assuming that the item identifier and slot number can be stored in constant space), by
maintaining a counter for the number of timeslots the item has appeared in so far, in addition
to one bit of state for whether or not the item has appeared in the current timeslot. The total
space consumed by the naive algorithm is of the order of the number of distinct items in the
stream. In general, this would be a large number and the space overhead may make it infeasible
for this algorithm to be deployed within a network router.
Space Lower Bound for Exact Tracking: We now show that any algorithm that solves
Problem 1 exactly must require Ω(m) space in the worst case, where m is the number of distinct
items in the input. Importantly, Ω(m) space is needed even if the number of persistent items
is much smaller than m.
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Lemma 2.2.1 Any algorithm that can exactly solve Problem 1 must use Ω(m log(nα+ 1)) bits
of space in the worst case, where m is the number of distinct items in the input.
Proof: Without loss of generality, suppose that the m distinct items that appear in the
stream are labeled 1, 2, 3, . . . ,m. Consider the state of the stream after observing k = (n−αn)
timeslots. For i from 1 to m, let ni denote the number of timeslots among 1, 2, . . . , k during
which item i has appeared. Consider the vector u = 〈n1, n2, . . . , nm〉. Consider the following
set V of possible assignments to u, where each component in u is chosen from the range
0, 1, 2, . . . , αn. The size of V is (1 + nα)m. We show that any algorithm that solves Problem
1 must distinguish between two distinct vectors in V , and hence must have a different state of
its memory for two input streams that result in different assignments to u.
We use proof by contradiction. Suppose the above was not true, and there were two input
streams A and B which, at the end of k slots, resulted in vectors vA, vB ∈ V respectively.
Suppose vA 6= vB but the states of the algorithm’s memory were the same after observing the
two inputs. Now, vA and vB must differ in at least one coordinate. Without loss of generality,
suppose they differed in coordinate 1, so n1(A) 6= n1(B), and without loss of generality suppose
n1(A) < n1(B). Consider the rest of the stream, from slot n − nα onwards. Suppose these
slots had nα−n1(B) slots in which item 1 occurred. Clearly, appending this stream to stream
A results in a stream with n slots where the persistence of item 1 is n1(A) + (nα − n1(B)) =
nα− (n1(B)− n1(A)) < nα, and appending this same stream to stream B results in a stream
with n slots where the persistence of item 1 is nα. Thus, item 1 must be reported as α-persistent
in the latter case, and not in the former case. But this is not possible, since the algorithm has
the same memory state for both A and B, and sees the same substream henceforth, leading to
a contradiction.
To distinguish between any two vectors in V , the algorithm needs at least log |V | bits of
memory. Since the size of V is (nα+ 1)m, the lower bound is Ω(m log(nα+ 1)) bits.
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2.2.2 Approximate Tracking of Persistent Items
In light of the above lower bound on the space cost of exact tracking of persistent items, we
define a relaxed version of the problem. Here, in addition to the persistence threshold α, the
user provides two additional parameters,  ∈ [0, 1], an “uncertainty parameter”, and δ ∈ [0, 1],
an error probability.
Problem 2 Approximate Tracking of Persistent Items over a Fixed Window: Given
a fixed window W = Sn1 , persistence threshold α, approximation parameter , and error proba-
bility δ, devise a small space algorithm that returns a set of items with the following properties.
A. Every Persistent Item is reported with high probability. If pd(1, n) ≥ α, then d is returned
as being persistent with a probability at least 1− δ.
B. Items that are far from persistent are not reported. If pd(1, n) < (α− ) · n, then d is not
reported
Sliding Windows. The sliding window version of the problem requires that we continu-
ously monitor the window of the n most recent timeslots in the stream.
Problem 3 Approximately identifying Persistent Items over a Sliding Window: The
problem of approximately tracking persistent items over a sliding window is the same as the
above Problem 2, except that the window of interest, W , is the set of the n most recent timeslots
in the stream, and changes continuously with time.
The fixed window version is a special case of the sliding window, where the window is equal
to the entire stream. The space lower bound for fixed window obviously applies to the sliding
window version, hence it is also necessary to consider an approximate version of the problem
for sliding windows, if we are to achieve a small space solution.
2.3 An Algorithm for Approximate Tracking of Persistent Items
We present algorithms for approximate tracking of persistent items in a stream. We first
present the algorithm for tracking persistent items over a fixed window, followed by a proof of
correctness and analysis of complexity. We then present the algorithm for sliding window.
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2.3.1 Fixed Window
Intuition. The goal is to track the persistence of as few items in the stream as possible, and
hence minimize the workspace used by the algorithm. Ideally, we track (and hence, use space
for) only the α-persistent items in the stream, and not the rest. But this is impossible, since
we do not know in advance which items are α-persistent.
The strategy is to set up a hash-based “filter”. Each stream element is sent through this
filter, and if it is selected by the filter, then the persistence of the corresponding item is tracked
in future timeslots. The filter behaves in such a way that if the same item reappears in the same
timeslot, then its chances of being selected by the filter are not enhanced, but if the same item
reappears in different timeslots, then its chances of passing the filter get progressively better.
For achieving the above, the filter for an item is selected to be dependent on the output of a
hash function whose inputs are both the item identifier as well as the timeslot within which it
appeared.
Let h denote a hash function that takes two inputs, and whose output is a random real
number in the range [0, 1]. For item d arriving in slot t, the item passes through the filter if
h(d, t) < τ , for some pre-selected threshold τ . The value of τ is chosen to be small enough that
an item with a small value of persistence is not likely to cross this filter; in particular, transient
items which only occur in a constant number of timeslots will almost certainly not make it.
Note that if the same item d reappears in the same timeslot t, then the hash output h(d, t) is
the same as before, hence the probability of the item passing the filter does not increase.
After an item has passed the filter, the persistence of this item in the remaining timeslots
is tracked exactly, since this requires only a constant amount of additional space (per item).
Finally, the persistence of an item is estimated as the number of slots that it has appeared in
since it started being tracked (this is known exactly), plus an estimate of the number of slots
it had to appear in before we started tracking it. An item is returned as α-persistent if its
estimated persistence is greater than a threshold T (decided by the analysis). Note that there
may be items which are being tracked because they passed the filter, but are not returned as
α-persistent, since the estimate of their persistence did not exceed T .
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The higher the threshold τ , the greater is the accuracy in our estimate of the persistence,
but this comes at the cost of higher memory consumption since more items will now pass the
filter. Setting the value of τ gives us a way to tradeoff accuracy versus space.
Formal Description. Let D(S) denote the set of distinct items in the stream S, and suppose
that the timeslots of interest are 1, 2, . . . , n. The stream processor tracks only a subset of D(S),
and maintains a data structure that we call a “sketch”, which summarizes the stream elements
seen so far. Let S denote the sketch data structure maintained by the algorithm.
S is a set of tuples of the form (d, nd, td), where d is an item that has appeared in the
stream, nd is the number of slots in which d has appeared, since we started tracking it, and td
is the most recent timeslot during which d has appeared. For each item d, if d is being tracked,
then there is a tuple of the form (d, ·, ·) belonging in S; if d is not being tracked, then there is
no such tuple in S. For each item d, there can never be more than one tuple of the form (d, ·, ·)
in S at a time. We say d ∈ S to mean “there is a tuple (d, ·, ·) belonging to S”. Similarly, we
say d 6∈ S.
The inputs to the algorithm are the persistence threshold α, the total number of slots n,
approximation parameter , and error probability δ. The algorithm selects a hash function
h(d, t) where d is an item, and t is the timeslot number. It is assumed that h(d, t) is a uniform
random real number in (0, 1), and that the outputs of h on different inputs are mutually
independent; when presented with the same input (d, t), the hash function returns the same
output. We note that it is possible to work with weaker assumptions of hash functions whose
range is a finite set of integers, but we assume the current model for simplicity and ease of
exposition.
Before any element arrives, Algorithm 8 Sketch-Initialize is invoked to initialize the data
structures. When an element (d, t) arrives, Algorithm 9 is invoked to update the S data
structure. When there is a query for persistent items in the stream, Algorithm 3 Detect-
Persistent-Items is called to process the query and will return a list of all items deemed persistent.
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Algorithm 1: Sketch-Initialize(m,n, α, , δ)
Input: Size of domain m; Total number of slots n; persistence threshold α; parameter ;
error probability δ
1 Initialize the hash function h : ([1,m]× [1, n])→ (0, 1);
2 S ← φ; τ ← 2n ; T ← αn− n2
Algorithm 2: Sketch-Update(d, t)
Input: d is an item; t is the timeslot of arrival
1 if d ∈ S then
2 if td < t then
/* d appeared in a new slot */
3 nd ← nd + 1; td ← t;
4 end
5 else
6 if h(d, t) < τ then
/* Start tracking item d from now onwards */
7 S ← S ∪ (d, 1, t);
8 end
9 end
Algorithm 3: Detect-Persistent-Items
1 foreach tuple (d, nd, td) ∈ S do
2 pˆd ← nd + 1τ
3 if pˆd ≥ T then
4 Report d as a persistent item
5 end
6 end
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2.3.1.1 Analysis of the Fixed Window Algorithm
We present the proof of correctness and analysis of space complexity. Consider an item
d, with absolute persistence pd = pd(1, n). For parameter q, 0 < q ≤ 1, let G(q) denote the
geometric random variable with parameter q, i.e., the number of Bernoulli trials till a success
(including the trial when the success occurred), where the different trials are all independent,
and the success probability is q in each trial.
For each item d that appeared in the stream, there are two possibilities: (1) either d is
tracked by the algorithm from some timeslot t onwards, or (2) d is not tracked by the algorithm,
because none of the tuples (d, t) were selected by the filter.
In each distinct slot where d appears, the probability of d being sampled into the sketch is
τ . If G(τ) > pd, then this will lead to case (2) above, and d will fail to make it into the sketch
S. On the other hand, if G(τ) ≤ pd, this will lead to case (1), and d will be inserted into the
sketch at some timeslot in Algorithm 9, and the counter nd = pd −G(τ) + 1.
Lemma 2.3.1 False Negative: If an item d has pd ≥ αn, then the probability that this item
will not be reported as α-persistent by Algorithm 3 is no more than e−2.
Proof: From Algorithm 3, the item will not be reported if pˆd < T , i.e., nd + 1τ < T . Using
τ = 2n and T = αn− n2 , we get:
Pr[False Negative] = Pr[pd −G(τ) + 1 + 1
τ
< T ]
= Pr[G(τ) > 1 +
1
τ
+ pd − T ]
= Pr[G(τ) > 1 +
1
τ
+
n
2
+ (pd − αn)]
≤ Pr[G(τ) > 2
τ
]
In the last step, we have used the fact pd ≥ αn, and 1τ = n2 . Using the fact Pr[G(p) > t] =
(1− p)t, we get
Pr[False Negative] ≤ (1− τ) 2τ ≤ e−2
In the last step, we have used the inequality 1− x ≤ e−x.
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Lemma 2.3.2 Items that are far from persistent are not reported: If an item d has
pd < (α− )n, then d will not be reported by Algorithm 3 as an α-persistent item.
Proof: For such an item, the value of nd at the end of observation is nd = pd−G(τ) + 1. Let
f denote the probability that d is reported as α-persistent. We have:
f = Pr[nd +
1
τ
≥ T ]
= Pr[pd −G(τ) + 1 + 1
τ
≥ αn− 1
τ
]
= Pr[G(τ) ≤ (pd − αn) + 1 + 2
τ
]
= Pr[G(τ) ≤ pd − (α− )n+ 1]
≤ Pr[G(τ) ≤ 0] = 0
Lemma 2.3.3 The expected space taken by the S is O
(
1
n
∑
d∈D(S) pd
)
, where D(S) is the set
of all distinct items in stream S. We assume that storing a tuple (d, nd, td) takes a constant
amount of space.
Proof: The space taken by S is a random variable, since the decision of whether or not to
allocate space to an item is a randomized decision. For item d, let random variable Zd be
defined as follows. Zd = 1 if the algorithm tracks d, i.e d ∈ S, and Zd = 0 otherwise.
Let Z =
∑
d∈D(S) Zd. If we assume that the space required for storing a single tuple (d, ·, ·)
in S is a constant number of bytes, say c, then the space used by S is cZ bytes. Now, for the
random variable Z, by linearity of expectation, we get:
E[Z] = E
 ∑
d∈D(S)
Zd
 = ∑
d∈D(S)
E[Zd] =
∑
d∈D(S)
Pr[Zd = 1] (2.1)
Pr[Zd = 0] = (1− τ)pd (2.2)
Using Taylor’s expansion,
e−2τ ≤ 1− 2τ + 4τ2/2
≤ 1− 2τ + τ = 1− τ (assuming τ ≤ 1/2)
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Using in Equation 2.2, we get:
Pr[Zd = 0] ≥ (e−2τ )pd = e−2τpd
Thus,
Pr[Zd = 1] = 1− Pr[Zd = 0] ≤ (1− e−2τpd)
≤ (1− (1− 2τpd))(using e−x > 1− x)
= 2τpd
Using in Equation 2.1, we get:
E[Z] ≤
∑
d∈D(S)
2τpd = 2τ
∑
d∈D(S)
pd =
4
n
∑
d∈D(S)
pd
Discussion: The expression for the space complexity shows that the expected space re-
quired for an item d is proportional to pd/n. Note that pd can range from 1 till n, but in a
typical stream, the persistence of most items can be expected to be small, with only a few items
having a large persistence. Thus, in the typical case, for example, with a Zipfian distribution
of packet frequencies and persistence, the space taken by the sketch will be much smaller than
the number of distinct items in the input.
Space Complexity for Specific Distributions. Let P =
∑
d∈D(S) pd denote the sum of
the persistence values of all items in the stream. We now show that if the persistence values of
the different items followed a Zipfian distribution, then P = O(n), leading to a constant space
complexity, independent of the number of distinct items in the input.
Lemma 2.3.4 If the persistence of different items in D(S) followed a Zipfian distribution,
then the space complexity of the sketch is O(1 ).
Proof: Let ρk be the persistence of the kth most persistent item for k ∈ 1, 2, ..., |D(S)|. With
a Zipfian distribution, ρk = ckβ , for some c > 0 and β > 1. Since the persistence of an item is
bounded by n, ρ1 = c ≤ n. Let ζ(·) be the Reimann Zeta function.
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∑
d∈D(S)
pd =
∑
k≤|D(S)|
c
kβ
≤ c
∞∑
k=1
1
kβ
= cζ(β) ≤ nζ(β)
Thus, from Lemma 2.3.3, we have E[Z] ≤ 4nnζ(β) = 4ζ(β)
By the Maclaurin-Cauchy test, we know for β > 1, the series represented by ζ(β) converges,
and is usually a small constant, which proves the lemma. For example, if β = 1.5, then
ζ(1.5) = 2.6. For this case, we get:
∑
d∈D(S) pd ≤ 2.6n, and thus, from Lemma 2.3.3, E[Z] < 11 .
Theorem 2.3.1 The above algorithms 9 and 3 can be used in an algorithm for tracking per-
sistent items in a fixed window with the following properties:
A. Each α-persistent item is reported with probability at least 1− δ.
B. No item d such that pd < (α− )n is reported.
C. The space complexity of the algorithm is O
(
P log (1/δ)
n
)
, where P =
∑
d∈D(S) pd.
D. The processing time per stream element is O(log 1δ ).
Proof: Algorithms 9 and 3 achieve most of the above properties. From Lemma 2.3.1, we get
that the probability of a persistent item not being reported is no more than e−2. The only task
now is to bring down the probability of a false negative to δ.
To achieve this, we run (1/2) ln 1δ instances of Algorithm 9 in parallel, and return the union
of the items reported by all the instances. For an item that is persistent, it is not reported
only if it is missed by every instance. The probability that this happens is no more than(
e−2
)(1/2) ln 1
δ , which is δ. For an item d whose persistence is less than (α − )n, from Lemma
2.3.2, we see that the item is not returned by any instance, and hence will not be present in
aggregated result, proving property B.
Property C follows from Lemma 2.3.3, adding a multiplying factor of O(log 1δ ). For the time
complexity (property D), we note that Algorithm 9 can be made to run in constant expected
time if the sketch S is organized as a hash table with the item identifier as the key.
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2.3.2 Sliding Windows
In this setting, we are interested only in the substream of elements that belong to the n most
recent timeslots. If c is the current timeslot, then the window of interest is Scc−n+1. Note that
n here does not represent the number of timeslots in the stream, but the number of timeslots
in the window. We now present an algorithm solving Problem 3. The intuition for the sliding
window algorithm is as follows.
Suppose we started a new fixed window data structure for each new timeslot. This would
suffice, since any sliding window query in the future will be covered by one of these fixed window
data structures. For now, suppose that St was the fixed window data structure that we start
from time t onwards (this will serve the window St+n−1t ). At first glance, it seems like this
would be too much space, since the cost would be n times the space for a single fixed window
data structure.
The space can be reduced through the following observations: (1) when we start a fixed
window data structure at a particular timeslot t, say, only a few of the items (approximately a
τ fraction of the items) that arrive in timeslot t will be selected into this data structure; (2) for
those items d that were not selected into St in timeslot t, the tuple for d in St can be shared
with the tuple for d in St+1; (3) further, when the current timeslot is t, we can afford to discard
Sr for r ≤ (t− n), since these data structures will never be used in a future query.
Thus, the sketch used by our algorithm at time c is effectively ∪ci=c−n+1Si, where Si is the
fixed window sketch starting at timeslot i. Through observation (2), we reduce the space by
having a single tuple for d in Si,Si+1, . . . ,Sj such that j is the first timeslot in i, i + 1, . . . , j
where d was selected into the sketch.
The formal description of the algorithm for the Sliding Window model is presented in
Algorithms 4, 5, 6, and 7. The sketch S is a set of tuples of the form (d, t, nd,t, td,t), where d is
an item identifier, t is the timeslot when this tuple was created, nd,t is the number of timeslots
since t when d has reappeared, and td,t is some state that we maintain to eliminate counting
reoccurrences of d within the same timeslot. In the following discussion, we say “(d, t) belongs
in the sketch”, or “(d, t) ∈ S”, if there is a 4-tuple of the form (d, t, ·, ·) in the sketch. In our
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sketch, for any item d and timeslot t, there can be at most one tuple of the form (d, t, ·, ·).
Algorithm 4: Sliding-Window-Sketch-Initialize (m,n,N, α, , δ)
Input: Size of domain m; window size n; maximum number of slots N ; persistence
threshold α; parameter ; error probability δ
1 Initialize the hash function h : ([1,m]× [1, N ])→ (0, 1);
2 S ← φ; τ ← 2n ;T ← (α− 2)n
Algorithm 5: Sliding-Window-Sketch-Update(d, t)
Input: d is an item; t is the timeslot of arrival
1 if (d, t) ∈ S then
2 return
3 end
// Consider starting a new tuple, tracking d from slot t onwards.
4 if h(d, t) < τ then
5 S ← S ∪ (d, t, 1, t)
6 end
7 foreach t′ such that (d, t′) ∈ S do
8 Let (d, t′, nd,t′ , td,t′) be the tuple corresponding to (d, t′)
// Incorporate (d, t) into this tuple if not been done yet
9 if td,t′ < t then
// d has not been seen in slot t by this tuple
10 nd,t′ ← nd,t′ + 1; td,t′ ← t
11 end
12 end
During the initialization phase of the algorithm, S is initialized to empty, τ to 2n , and T
to αn− n2 . When we want to add an element (d, t) to the sketch, there are two possible cases.
First, if there is an entry in the sketch of the form (d, t, ·, ·), then this element can be safely
ignored, since the same combination of item and timeslot has been observed earlier. Otherwise,
if (d, t) hashes to an appropriately small value (less than τ), then a new entry is created for
tracking d, starting from time t onwards, that will serve to answer queries on certain windows
that include t within them. Simultaneously, (d, t) is used to update each of the tuples in S that
track d. Whenever time advances, and the window slides forward from t to t + 1, all entries
(d, t′, ·, ·) in S such that t′ ≤ (t − n) are discarded, because stream windows of current and
future interest will not be served by this entry. Let ptd = pd(t− n+ 1, t) denote the persistence
of d over the window [t− n+ 1, t].
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Algorithm 6: Actions taken when timeslot changes from c− 1 to c
// Discard old items
1 Discard items (d, t, ·, ·) ∈ S where t ≤ (c− n)
Algorithm 7: Sliding-Window-Detect-Persistent-Items(c)
Input: c is the current timeslot. The window of interest is [c− n+ 1, c].
1 Let Scur be all tuples (d, t′, nd,t′ , td,t′) in S such that both the following conditions are
true: (A) t′ ≥ (c− n+ 1) and (B) There is no t′′ such that (d, t′′) ∈ S and
(c− n+ 1) ≤ t′′ < t′.
2 foreach tuple (d, ·, nd, td) ∈ Scur do
3 pˆcd ← nd + 1τ
4 if pˆcd ≥ T then
5 Report d as a persistent item in the window
6 end
7 end
2.3.2.1 Correctness and Complexity
For a pair (d, t) where d is an item identifier and t is a time slot, (d, t) is said to be stored
in S at time c if there exists a tuple (d, t, ·, ·) in S at time c.
Lemma 2.3.5 Items that are far from persistent in the window are not reported:
At time c, if an item d has pcd < (α−n), then d will not be reported as persistent in the window
in Algorithm 7.
Proof: Consider such an item d, where pcd < (α− n). We analyze the instances when d was
processed by Algorithm 5. If d was never stored in the sketch from time c−n+1 onwards, then
there will not exist a tuple (d, t′, ·, ·) in S at time c, and d will not be reported by Algorithm 7.
Suppose at time c, there existed a tuple (d, t′, nd, td) in S, such that t′ ≥ (c− n+ 1). This
tuple was inserted into the sketch at time t′. From Algorithm 5, it can be seen that nd is equal
to the number of occurrences of d in timeslots t′, t′ + 1, t′ + 2, . . . , c. This number cannot be
more than pcd, and hence nd ≤ pcd < (α− )n.
In Algorithm 7, for item d, it must be true that:
pˆcd = nd +
1
τ
< (α− )n+ n
2
= αn− n
2
= T
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Since pˆcd < T , d will not be reported as persistent.
Lemma 2.3.6 Sliding Window False Negative: At time c, if an item d has pcd ≥ αn,
then the probability that this item will not be reported as α-persistent in the current window by
Algorithm 7 is no more than e−2.
Proof: Suppose that d was sampled into the sketch later than time (c−n), i.e., there exists a
tuple (d, t, nd, ·) such that t > (c−n). In such a case, Algorithm 7 selects the tuple (d, t′, nd, td)
such that (A) t′ > (c− n) and (B) there is no tuple (d, t′′, ·, ·) in S such that t′′ < t′. In other
words, t′ is the earliest timeslot in [c − n + 1, c] when a sketch for d was initialized. Thus, it
follows that from time c−n+ 1 onwards (inclusive), d was not selected into the sketch till time
t′. The number of times that d needs to occur in slots c− n+ 1, c− n+ 2, . . . till it is sampled
into S is G(τ) (the geometric random variable with parameter τ). The counter nd keeps track
of the number of times d occurred in different timeslots starting from slot t′ (inclusive). Since
d occurred in the window in a total of pcd distinct slots, nd = p
c
d −G(τ) + 1.
Pr[False Negative] = Pr[pcd −G(τ) + 1 +
1
τ
< T ]
In the proof of Lemma 2.3.1, it is shown that the above probability is no more than e−2 if
pcd ≥ αn, and the lemma follows.
2.3.3 Space Complexity
The following result is useful for the space complexity.
Lemma 2.3.7 A tuple (d, t) is stored in S at time c if and only if both the following conditions
are true:
A. t > (c− n)
B. h(d, t) < τ
Proof: Suppose (d, t) is stored in S at time c. From Algorithm 6, it is clear that t > (c− n),
since otherwise (d, t) would have been discarded from the sketch. This proves condition A.
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Also, in Algorithm 5, if h(d, t) ≥ τ , then (d, t) would never have been inserted into the sketch.
Thus, it must be true that h(d, t) < τ , proving condition B.
Now, suppose that both A and B were true. Then, it is clear that in Algorithm 5, (d, t) will
be inserted into the sketch when it first appears. Further, this tuple will never be discarded
from the sketch in Algorithm 6 since our current timeslot c satisfies c < (t+ n).
Lemma 2.3.8 Space Complexity: Let Zc denote the number of tuples in S at time c, and
D denote the set of all distinct items that appeared during timeslots c− n+ 1 till c. Then,
E[Zc] =
2
n
∑
d∈D
pcd
Proof: First, it can be verified that in Algorithm 5, if the same tuple (d, t) occurs multiple
times, then the effect on the sketch is the same as if (d, t) occurred only once in the stream.
Thus we can ignore repeated arrivals of the same tuple (d, t).
For each tuple (d, t) that arrived, let random variable Zcd,t be defined as follows. Z
c
d,t is 1 if
tuple (d, t) is stored in S at time c. Let D(S) denote the set of all distinct tuples (d, t) in the
stream so far.
We have
Zc =
∑
(d,t)∈D(S)
Zcd,t
From Lemma 2.3.7, we have that Zcd,t = 0 if t ≤ (c−n). Thus, we can rewrite the above as:
Zc =
∑
{(d,t)|t>(c−n)}
Zcd,t (2.3)
To compute the expectation of Zc, we use linearity of expectation:
E[Zc] = E
 ∑
{(d,t)|t>(c−n)}
Zcd,t
 = ∑
{(d,t)|t>(c−n)}
E
[
Zcd,t
]
For a tuple (d, t) such that t > (c− n), Zcd,t is equal to 1 if it was sampled into the sketch
at time t i.e., if h(d, t) < τ . The probability of this event is τ = 2n . Let D denote the set of all
distinct items that appeared in the stream during a timeslot i such that (c− n) < i ≤ c.
E[Zc] =
∑
{(d,t)|t>(c−n)}
τ =
∑
d∈D
(pcd · τ) =
2
n
∑
d∈D
pcd
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2.4 Evaluation
We evaluated our small space algorithm and contrasted its performance with that of a naive
(exact) algorithm, by running the two on the following three (one real, two synthetic) datasets
described below. The goal of our experiments is to show how the performance of our algorithm
varies with the skewness of persistence of the items appearing in a stream.
Dataset design:
• HeaderTrace: This is a real-world traffic trace dataset. The trace used had 885 million
packets collected during a 3-hour period from a large Internet backbone link (source:
CAIDA [24]). The data consists of timestamped packet headers, with the source and
destination addresses, in addition to other attributes. From this packet header trace, we
extracted a sequence of (destination IP address, timestamp) pairs which forms the input
data stream. We divided the entire trace into slots of 30 seconds (to obtain a trace of
360 slots). The sliding window length was set to 100 slots.
• Synthetic1: This is a synthetic dataset that comprised of 1,024,680,418 (timeslot,
itemID) tuples. The item-identifiers were from the universe {1, . . . , 4000000}, and the
trace was simulated for a period of 30 days, the length of each timeslot being 15 minutes.
Hence, there were 30·24·60/15 = 2880 distinct timeslots. We split the universe of size
4000000 in 10 disjoint groups, and defined a list F of 10 fractions (the constraint being∑10
i=1 Fi = 1) where Fi represented what fraction of the universe belongs to group i. We
also kept a list P of 10 fractions, where Pi indicated the persistence of Fi over the whole
trace of 2880 slots. The values of Fi’s and Pi’s are all listed in Table 2.1. As an example,
for i = 1, Fi = 0.01 and Pi = 0.95, which implies group 1 comprised of 1% of the items
of the universe (i.e., 40000 items), each of which will occur in 2880·0.95 = 2736 slots
on expectation. Note that, the way we assigned the values of Fi’s and Pi’s mimics the
real-life fact that the distribution of persistence is very skewed, so more than 50% of the
items in the universe occur in less than 3 slots (on expectation). In practice, we put an
item in group i in slot j ∈ {1, . . . , 2880} with probability Pi. Also, before generating
the actual tuples, we created a random permutation of the universe {1, . . . , 4000000} by
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FisherYates shuﬄe [47].
• Synthetic2: This is a synthetic dataset that comprised of 123,408,469 (timeslot, itemID)
tuples. Like Synthetic1, for this also, the item-identifiers were from the universe {1, . . . ,
4000000}, and the trace was simulated for 2880 distinct timeslots. It differs from Syn-
thetic1 in the values of Fi’s and Pi’s, and the difference is evident in Table 2.1. Note that,
for Synthetic2, 86% of the items in universe have a persistence of 0.001 only, whereas for
Synthetic1, 55% of the items in universe have that persistence. On the other hand, for
Synthetic1, 1% of the items in universe have a persistence of 0.95, whereas for Synthetic2,
0.1% of the items have that high persistence. This explains why the skewness of Syn-
thetic2 is about thrice that of Synthetic1, and the mean persistence of Synthetic2 is about
1
9
th of that of Synthetic1.
Table 2.1: Distribution of persistence for all datasets
Partition of universe Synthetic1 Synthetic2 HeaderTrace
Fi Pi Fi Pi
i = 1 0.01 0.95 0.001 0.95
i = 2 0.02 0.75 0.002 0.75
i = 3 0.03 0.55 0.003 0.55
i = 4 0.04 0.35 0.004 0.35
i = 5 0.05 0.25 0.005 0.25
i = 6 0.06 0.15 0.006 0.15
i = 7 0.07 0.1 0.007 0.1
i = 8 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.05
i = 9 0.09 0.01 0.1 0.01
i = 10 0.55 0.001 0.862 0.001∑10
i=1 Fi 1 1
Size of universe 4,000,000 4,000,000 2,047,953
Exp. packets 1,024,704,000 123,402,240
Actual packets 1,024,680,418 123,408,469 885,055,227
Mean persistence 0.089 0.01 0.0177
Third moment of persistence (m3) 0.0105 0.0014 0.0043
Variance of persistence (m2) 0.015 0.0019 0.006
Skewness of persistence (m3/m23/2) 5.67 17.17 9.28
There is no obvious choice on what should be a suitable duration of the timeslot, since
prior research has shown that the delay between successive botnet-related communications to
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the same destination can range from a few minutes to a few days. A duration of a few minutes
is reasonable, since many botnets have multiple events occurring within this time frame. For
example, Li et al [85] observed periodic botnet-related events about every half an hour. Rajab
et al [98] reported that the average “staying time” for bots that they monitored was about 25
minutes, and 90% of them lasted less than 50 minutes. Over a 24-hour window, the BRAT
project [106] reported probes by 8 fast-flux botnets which showed periodicity, the periods being
in the range of 1-10 minutes. Porras et al [97] showed that for iKeeB, the iPhone-based botnet, a
compromised iPhone runs a shell script once every 5 minutes. For the HeaderTrace dataset,
we finally decided on a duration of 30 seconds so that our 3 hour trace led to a sufficient
number of slots, and for the Synthetic1 and Synthetic2 datasets, we chose the length to be
15 minutes. This helped us evaluate the scalability of our algorithm with increasing number
of timeslots, and also to experiment with different slot-lengths. With the above setting of
parameters, for the HeaderTrace and the synthetic datasets, we had reasonably large number
of timeslots (360 and 2880 respectively) as well as a large number of packets per timeslot.
The algorithms were implemented in C++ using the STL extensions. For the hash functions
in the small space algorithm (Algorithm 5), we used an endian-neutral implementation of
the Murmur Hash algorithm [16], which is generally considered to generate high quality hash
outputs.
We obtained the ground truth about the persistence of individual items (IP addresses
for HeaderTrace) by running the naive algorithm over the input data streams. Note that,
although for the synthetic datasets, we determined which item will have how much persistence,
the actual data was generated by a probabilistic process, so we still needed to collect the actual
persistence values of the items. In the process, for the HeaderTrace dataset, we discovered
that a large fraction of the windows did not contain many persistent items. On such windows,
our algorithm will run in a space-efficient manner, but we did not consider these windows since
there would not be enough data for a fair comparison.
To simplify the presentation, on HeaderTrace, we focus on 11 specific “query” windows:
these are [1, 100], [26, 125], [51, 150], . . . , [251, 350]. On both the synthetic datasets, the query
windows are [1, 288], [289, 576], . . . , [2593, 2880], so on these two, the time-duration of the query
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window was 288·15/60 = 72 hours. We use window [a, b] to denote the window of all timeslots
starting from a till b (both endpoints included).
On HeaderTrace, we found that the cumulative distribution of the persistence values in
the dataset was highly skewed, for every query window that we tried. We present the CDF of
persistence for three out of the 11 query windows: [1, 100], [101, 200] and [201, 300] in Figure 2.1,
but all the 11 query windows showed similar pattern. For example, in the [101, 200] window,
more than 50% IP addresses occur in 1 slot only, and 95% of the IP addresses occur in 20 or
less slots. This confirms the utility of an algorithm like ours, which requires less space when
items have lower average persistence. We made the distribution of Synthetic1 less skewed
(Figure 2.2) than that of HeaderTrace (skewnesses are respectively 5.67 and 9.28, as shown
in Table 2.1), to construct Synthetic1 as an adversarial input dataset, and found the results
for HeaderTrace better than those for Synthetic1. In Figure 2.2, we present the CDF for
only one query window as the distributions are identical across all windows, because of the
way the dataset is generated. Then again, we constructed Synthetic2 as the dataset with
highest skew (17.17, as in Table 2.1) of all three, and thus it shows some improvement over
Synthetic1, as we explain later.
Metrics: The following metrics were used. For parameter α, an item that is not α-
persistent is called “transient”.
The False Negative Rate (FNR) is defined as the ratio of the number of items that were
α-persistent, but were not reported by the small space algorithm, to the total number of α-
persistent items in the window.
The False Positive Rate (FPR) is defined as the ratio of the number of transient items that
were reported as persistent by the algorithm, to the total number of transient items.
The Space Compression (SC) is defined as the ratio of the number of tuples stored by the
naive algorithm to the number of tuples stored by the small space algorithm.
The Physical Space Compression (PSC) is defined as the maximum resident set size of
the naive algorithm to that of the small-space algorithm.
The notion of Space Compression (SC) is a logical one, and for the sliding window version
of the problem (Problem 3), we were interested in the number of tuples of the form (d, t, ·, ·),
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as referred to in Algorithms 5 to 7.
In the actual implementation, for each distinct item d, we maintained a sorted list (of
variable size) of (t′, nd,t′) tuples, ordered by t′, where nd,t′ indicates in how many distinct slots
d has appeared since its appearance in slot t′. The sorted list helped us to check by binary-
search if an item d has occurred in a given slot t′. When d appears in a slot t′ it has not
appeared in before, the tuple (t′, nd,t′) is initialized only if h(d, t′) < τ . Note that td,t′ - the
last timeslot d has appeared in since its appearance in t′, does not depend on t′, and hence we
maintained a single copy of this variable for each item d.
For computing the Physical Space Compression (PSC), for each combination of α and ,
we actually created a new process so that the resident set is created afresh. We expect the
Physical Space Compression for (α, ′) to be higher than that for (α, ) when ′ >  (because τ
is lower for ′), but we found that because of the way memory allocation algorithms work, if the
algorithm runs first for (α, ) and then for (α, ′) (using the same process), then, the memory
allocated for (α, ) is enough to accomodate the algorithm for (α, ′), and the space-saving due
to (α, ′) does not get reflected.
Note that both the numerator and the denominator of each metric depend on the query
window [c− n+ 1, c] (n is the window length). To measure the ratios, we ran the small-space
algorithm on the query windows defined previously and in each window, recorded all the items
that were marked as persistent by the algorithm. The only source of randomness in each run
is the output of the Murmur Hash function and we ran each simulation thrice using different
seeds (we saw very minor variation in the results when different seeds were used.) Thus, for
each parameter setting we had 11 × 3 data points for HeaderTrace, and 10 × 3 data points
for both the synthetic datasets, and in each we recorded the false positives, the false negatives,
and the number of tuples that were tracked. The ratios computed (by comparing to the naive
algorithm) are then averaged across all the runs.
Observations along metrics:
For every value of α, the False Negative Rate (Figure 2.4a for HeaderTrace, Figure 2.5a
for Synthetic1 and Figure 2.6a for Synthetic2) increases as  increases, which is expected.
However, although Lemma 2.3.6 bounds the False Negative Rate to 1
e2
= 13%, the algorithm
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Figure 2.1: CDF of persistence values from 3 windows for the HeaderTrace dataset
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Figure 2.2: CDF of persistence values from the [1,288] window for the Synthetic1 dataset
performed much better in practice - we found that even for α = 0.3 and  = 0.21, the FNR
was as low as 2% for HeaderTrace and ∼3.5% for both the synthetic datasets. Note that α
is a relative measure of error tolerance in α, which in this case is as high as 70%. The highest
FNR we ever got was less than 10% for HeaderTrace, less than 12% for Synthetic1 and
12.7% for Synthetic2. However, for all the three datasets, this was for the highest setting of
α (α = 0.9) - the number of false negatives for this were higher than for the other settings, for
similar values of . One possible reason is that for α = 0.9, an item that was 0.9-persistent
had persistence very close to 0.9n. Whereas, many of the items that were 0.3-persistent had
persistence values that were much larger than 0.3n. Items that have persistence values close to
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Figure 2.3: CDF of persistence values from the [1,288] window for the Synthetic2 dataset
the threshold, but higher than it, have a greater chance of not being reported than items whose
persistence values are far above the threshold. Hence, the false negative ratio for α = 0.9 is a
little higher.
The False Positive Rate, similar to the False Negative Rate, shows (Figure 2.4b for Head-
erTrace, Figure 2.5b for Synthetic1 and Figure 2.6b for Synthetic2) an increasing trend as
 increases. The maximum FPR was 2.69% for HeaderTrace and 2.2% for Synthetic2 (both
for α = 0.3 and  = 0.21). Moreover, all of Figures 2.4b, 2.5b and 2.6b show that for the same
value of , the FPR is lower for higher values of α. The possible reason is that when α is very
high (e.g. 0.9), most items have persistence much lower than αn (as is evident from the CDFs
in Figures 2.1 and 2.2), hence are very unlikely to cross the threshold T in Algorithm 7.
The (Logical) Space Compression increases linearly with  (Figures 2.4c for HeaderTrace,
2.5c for Synthetic1 and 2.6c for Synthetic2), and we found the Space Compression is close
to 1τ =
n
2 , for all values of α and all three datasets. This is expected since the naive algorithm
creates a new tuple for an item everytime it appears in a different slot - where the small-space
algorithm creates a tuple with probability τ only. For α = 0.9, with  = 0.63, the logical
space compression was as high as 32 for HeaderTrace, and as high as 91 for Synthetic1 and
∼100 for Synthetic2. The higher Space Compression for the synthetic datasets compared to
HeaderTrace is justified by the larger value of the window length n (288 as opposed to 100).
For higher values of α, we could achieve better Space Compression as the tolerance  could be
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(d) Variation of PSC with α and 
Figure 2.4: Trade-off between accuracy and space for the small-space algorithm over sliding windows
for the HeaderTrace dataset. Each point in each plot is an average from 33 data points - 3 runs over
11 query windows each. Note that the Y-axis is different for each plot. Also, for each value of α, the
values of  range from 0.1α to 0.7α.
made higher while keeping the false positives and the false negatives small enough.
Like its logical counterpart, the Physical Space Compression also increases with  (Fig-
ure 2.4d for HeaderTrace, 2.5d for Synthetic1 and 2.6d for Synthetic2), and for each
distinct value of α, the Physical Space Compression grows almost linearly with . For higher
values of α, we could achieve better Space Compression as the tolerance  could be made higher.
While the size of the HeaderTrace dataset was 58 GB, the maximum resident set size of the
naive algorithm went upto 3 GB (at the query window [251,350]), whereas for typical parame-
ters like α = 0.5 and  = 0.35, the small-space algorithm took less than 15
th (600 MB) memory
(on average) compared to the naive algorithm. For Synthetic1, the dataset size was 12 GB,
the maximum resident set size of the naive algorithm went upto 1.8 GB, whereas for α = 0.5
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Figure 2.5: Trade-off between accuracy and space for the small-space algorithm over sliding windows
for the Synthetic1 dataset. Each point in each plot is an average from 30 data points - 3 runs over 10
query windows each. The Y-axis is different for each plot. For each value of α, the values of  range
from 0.1α to 0.7α.
and  = 0.35, the small-space algorithm took space between 350 and 500 MB. For Synthetic2,
the dataset size was 1.5 GB, the maximum resident set size of the naive algorithm went upto
736 MB, whereas for α = 0.5 and  = 0.35, the small-space algorithm took space between 140
and 200 MB.
Variation with , seed and query window: Figures 2.7a through 2.9c take a closer look at
some of the absolute numbers (actual memory used, number of true and false positives, number
of true and false negatives) rather than ratios for the Synthetic1 dataset, and show how they
vary with , the seed value of the random number generator and the different query windows.
Figure 2.7a shows how the physical memory (in KB) varies with  for α = 0.5 and the query
window [2593, 2880]. Since the memory taken by the naive algorithm does not depend on α or
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Figure 2.6: Trade-off between accuracy and space for the small-space algorithm over sliding windows
for the Synthetic2 dataset. Other details are same as Synthetic1.
, it is constant throughout at 1.86 GB, and the memory taken by the small space algorithm
falls from 800 MB to 500 MB as  increases from 0.05 to 0.35.
In Figure 2.7b, the actual number of persistent items in the window [2593, 2880] is constant
at 235,353; and we can see that with increasing , the number of true positives reduces only a
little, remaining very close to the number of actual persistent items throughout. The number
of false positives is as low as ∼3,600 when  = 0.05, and for typical values of  (e.g., 0.15) that
will probably be used in practice for a problem like this ), the number of false positives is ∼25k.
In Figure 2.7c, the actual number of transient items in the window [2593, 2880] is constant at
∼2.1m; and we can see that with increasing , the number of true negatives reduces only a little,
remaining very close to the number of actual transient items throughout. The number of false
negatives is as low as ∼2,200 when  = 0.05, and even when  is as high as 0.35, the number
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of false negatives increases only to ∼14k. Note that, for many practical applications, it is
important to keep the number/rate of false negatives much lower compared to the number/rate
of false positives, and comparing Figure 2.7b and 2.7c shows that our algoithm meets that
criterion.
Figure 2.8a shows how the physical memory (in KB) varies with the seed of the random
number generator for α = 0.5,  = 0.15 and the query window [2593, 2880]. Since the memory
taken by the naive algorithm does not depend on the seed of the random number generator, it
is constant throughout at 1.86 GB, and the memory taken by the small space algorithm also
remains practically constant at ∼593MB, which justifies averaging the actual memory footprint
over the 3 different seed values.
In Figure 2.8b, the actual number of persistent items in the window [2593, 2880] is constant
at 235,353; and we can see that with change in the seed, the number of true positives remains
practically constant at ∼227k, and so does the number of false positives at ∼26k.
In Figure 2.8c, the actual number of transient items in the window [2593, 2880] is constant
at ∼2.1m; and we can see that with change in the seed, the number of true negatives remains
practically constant at ∼2.07m, and so does the number of false negatives at ∼7.8k.
Figure 2.9a shows how the physical memory (in KB) varies with the query window for
α = 0.5 and  = 0.15, the seed of the random number generator being 10. Unlike Figure 2.7a or
Figure 2.8a, the physical memory depends on the number of distinct items in the window, and
although we generated the items uniformly across the slot range [1, 2880], we see it increased
gradually with increasing slot number. However, while the space taken by the naive algorithm
varied from 1.5 GB to 1.86 GB, the space taken by the small-space algorithm varied from ∼400
MB to ∼600MB.
Figure 2.9b shows how the number of persistent items varies with the query window for α =
0.5 and  = 0.15, the seed of the random number generator being 10. Since for the Synthetic1
dataset, each persistent item was distributed uniformly across the slot range [1, 2880], the actual
number of persistent items across the different windows was alomost constant at ∼235k; and
we can see that with change in the query window, the number of true positives also remains
practically constant at ∼227k, and so does the number of false positives at ∼26k.
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Figure 2.9c shows how the number of transient items varies with the query window for
α = 0.5 and  = 0.15, the seed of the random number generator being 10. For the Synthetic1
dataset, like the persistent items, each transient item was also distributed uniformly across
the slot range [1, 2880], hence the actual number of transient items across the different query
windows is practically constant at ∼2.1m; and we can see that with change in the query window,
the number of true negatives remains practically constant at ∼2.07m, and so does the number
of false negatives at ∼7.8k.
The small variation in the actual memory used, the number of true and false positives and
the number of true and false negatives by the small-space algorithm, as shown in Figures 2.8a
through 2.9c justifies our averaging of these quantities across the different seed values and
query windows.
Comparsion among three datasets: The FPR for HeaderTrace was much lower than
that for Synthetic1 at comparable points, e.g., at α = 0.3,  = 0.21 and in comparable query
windows, for Synthetic1, the FPR is 16%, whereas for HeaderTrace, the FPR is 2.7%.
For Synthetic1, at an identical query window, there are ∼300k false positives out of ∼1931k
transient items, and for HeaderTrace, there are ∼21k false positives out of ∼802k transient
items. The lower FPR for HeaderTrace probably arises out of the fact that the CDF curve
(Figure 2.1) grows more steeply than the CDF curve for Synthetic1 (Figure 2.2), so the
fraction of items whose persistence come anywhere close to 0.3 is much less. To demonstrate
the difference among the three datasets, we present the 93rd percentile value of persistence
for each. For HeaderTrace, there are total ∼829k distinct items in the window [251,350],
but ∼770k of these items occur in 10 or less slots out of 100, i.e., the 93rd percentile value of
persistence is 10%. As a comparison, for Synthetic1, there are total ∼2330k distinct items in
the window [2593, 2880], but ∼2167k of these items occur in 161 or less slots out of 288 (161/288
= 56%), i.e., the 93rd percentile value of persistence is 56%. But then again, for Synthetic2,
the FPR improves significantly over Synthetic1 - for α = 0.3 and  = 0.21, Synthetic2 gives
an FPR of 2.2% in pretty much all query windows - so the FPR becomes comparable to that of
HeaderTrace. To compare with Synthetic1, there are ∼1394k distinct items in the window
[2593, 2880], but ∼1296k of them occur in 28 or less slots out of 288, i.e., the 93rd percentile
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value of persistence is 9.7% (see Figure 2.3). The reason for lower FPR for Synthetic2 is
similar to that for HeaderTrace. This shows that the FPR improves with skewness of the
data, and our algorithm in fact performs well for datasets with realistic skewness.
The physical memory compression ratio is less for Synthetic1 than for HeaderTrace for
similar reasons - many transient items find room into the sketch for having persistence close
to the threshold. Although the skew for Synthetic2 is more than that of Synthetic1, it has
similar values of logical and physical memory compressions since the proportion of items from
the universe that have similar persistence values bear similar ratios to each other, e.g., for
Synthetic1, 1% of the items have persistence 0.95 and 2% have persistence 0.75; whereas for
Synthetic2, 0.1% of the items have persistence 0.95 and 0.2% have persistence 0.75 (first two
rows of Table 2.1).
In Lemma 2.3.8, we showed that for a given value of  and length of sliding window (n), the
expected number of tuples in the sketch is proportional to the sum of the persistence values of
all items appearing in the window (
∑
d∈D pcd). Hence, the physical memory taken should also
vary with the sum of the persistence values. We present the following example to demonstrate
this: in the [1, 288] window, the number of distinct items for Synthetic1 and Synthetic2
are respectively ∼2.33m and ∼1.39m, and the sum of persistence values for Synthetic1 and
Synthetic2 respectively are about 20.47 × 104 and 1.4 × 104. For α = 0.5 and  = 0.35,
the memory footprints by the small-space algorithm for this combination of parameters for
Synthetic1 and Synthetic2 are respectively 353 MB and 142 MB, so Synthetic1 takes
about 2.5 times more memory than Synthetic2.
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Figure 2.7: The variation of the physical memory taken, the number of true positives, false positives,
true negatives and false negatives with  for the Synthetic1 dataset. All the plots are for α = 0.5 and the
query window [2593, 2880]. So, each point in each plot is an average from 3 data points corresponding
to the 3 different seed values (10, 20, 30). Note that the horizontal lines in the three plots represent
respectively the actual memory taken by the naive algorithm, the actual number of persistent items and
the actual number of transient items, all measured in the same query window, and hence does not vary
with . The Y-axis is different for each plot. The values of  range from 0.1α to 0.7α.
52
10 20 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2 x 10
6
seed
Ph
ys
ica
l M
em
or
y
 
 
Small Space
Naive
(a) Variation of actual memory used with seed
10 20 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5 x 10
5
seed
#P
er
si
st
en
t i
te
m
s
 
 
#True Positives
#False Positives
#Actual Persistent Items
(b) Variation of number of true positives and
false positives with seed
10 20 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5 x 10
6
seed
#T
ra
ns
ie
nt
 it
em
s
 
 
#True Negatives
#False Negatives
#Actual Transitent Items
(c) Variation of number of true negatives and
false negatives with seed
Figure 2.8: The variation of the physical memory taken, the number of true positives, false positives,
true negatives and false negatives with the seed of the random number generator for the Synthetic1
dataset. All the plots are for α = 0.5,  = 0.15 and the query window [2593, 2880]. Note that the
horizontal lines in the three plots represent respectively the actual memory taken by the naive algorithm,
the actual number of persistent items and the actual number of transient items, all measured in the
same query window, and hence does not vary with the seed. The Y-axis is different for each plot. The
values of the seed used are 10, 20 and 30.
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Figure 2.9: The variation of the physical memory taken, the number of true positives, false positives,
true negatives and false negatives with the query window for the Synthetic1 dataset. All the plots
are for α = 0.5,  = 0.15 and seed = 10. Note that the horizontal lines in the three plots represent
respectively the actual memory taken by the naive algorithm, the actual number of persistent items
and the actual number of transient items - the first one shows slight increase with the progress of time
(increasing query window number) but the other two are practically constant. The Y-axis is different
for each plot. The query windows are [1, 288], [289, 576], . . . , [2593, 2880] and the values on the X-axis
are the endpoints of the query windows.
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2.5 Related Work
A large body of literature on network anomaly detection has focused on detecting volume-
based anomalies, i.e., tracking IPs which send or receive an unusally large volume of traffic
over an interval of time. While volume-based anomaly detection is relevant for Denial-of-
Service type attacks like SYN flood [108], UDP flood [109], Ping flood or P2P attacks, there
are many “stealthy” attacks [54], which can bypass the radar by never sending traffic in large
volume, yet remaining active over long windows in time, and probing the target network/host
once in a while. For example, port scans [102] look for open ports on remote hosts that have
applications with known vulnerabilities deployed on those ports; bots installed on compromised
hosts in a botnet keep on communicating with the C&C server, etc. Our work differs from these
in that persistent items may not result in large volumes of traffic and may escape detection by
a volume-based system.
It is interesting to compare how algorithmic techniques for identifying heavy-hitters (or “fre-
quent items”) may work for the problem of identifying persistent items. Broadly, the techniques
in the literature can be classified into “counter-based”, “quantile algorithms”, “sketches”, or
“random sampling-based” (see [31]). Counter-based techniques such as the Misra-Gries algo-
rithm [89], and the “Space-Saving” algorithm [88] rely on maintaining per-item counters for
counting the number of occurrences of each item that has been currently identified as being
frequent; these counters are occasionally decremented to ensure that the space taken by the
data structure is small. The difficulty in using this technique for our problem is that it is not
easy to ensure that re-occurrences of the same item within a timeslot have no effect on the
system state. For example, in the Misra-Gries algorithm, if there is a decrement of the counters
between two occurrences of an item within the same timeslot, it seems hard to ensure that the
second occurrence has no effect on the system state, especially given that the increment due to
the first occurrence may have disappeared from the system (due to the decrement). The same
argument is true for Lossy Counting too [87]. Quantile-based algorithms such as Greenwald
and Khanna, or [62], the q-digest [100] view the space of all items as being a bijection with
the set of integers, and associate counts with different ranges in this space of all items. In
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the q-digest algorithm, there are no decrements to these counters, so one may use “distinct
counters” such as those by Flajolet-Martin [51], or Gibbons and Tirthapura [57], or Kane,
Nelson, and Woodruff[70], instead of regular counters. Such an approach based on maintaining
distinct counters would not only be more complex than our approach, but also likely have a
greater space complexity, since maintaining distinct counters with a relative error of  requires
Ω(1/2) space [68]. The sketch approach, such as count-sketch [28] or count-min sketch [36] also
maintains multiple counters, each of which is the sum of many random variables. Replacing
each such counter with a distinct counter leads to its own set of difficulties, one of which is the
space complexity of distinct counting, explained above, and the other being the fact that each
distinct counter is only approximate (exact distinct counting necessarily requires large space
[13]), while the analyses in [28] and [36] rely on the different counters in the data structure
being exact.
Finally, our algorithm is inspired by the random sampling approaches based on the “sample
and count” scheme of Alon et al. [13, 12] and the “sticky sampling” algorithm of Manku and
Motwani [87]. Both these algorithms use the following idea: “sample a random element in the
stream, and track reoccurrences of this element exactly”. In these works, the idea was applied
to a different context than ours – sample and count was applied to track the size of a self-join
in limited storage, and sticky sampling was used in the identification of heavy hitters using
limited space. Our algorithm has the following technical differences when compared with the
above works. The sampling of an item is done using a hash function that is based on the
item identifier and the timeslot in which it arrived in. This hash-based sampling avoids giving
greater sampling probability to an item if it occurs multiple times within the same timeslot.
Further, reoccurrences are tracked in such a way that we do not overcount if the same item
appears again in the same timeslot. In addition, we show how to handle sliding windows using
nearly the same space, while the above works do not address the context of sliding windows.
A distinguishing aspect of our work on sliding windows is that while the extension to sliding
windows often requires asymptotically greater space than for the infinite window case (for
example, see Arasu and Manku [17]), in our case the space complexity increases only by a
factor of two.
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Persistence is exploited to detect botnet traffic in [59], using an algorithm that tracked the
state of every distinct item that arrived within the sliding window. Hence the memory used is
of the order of the number of distinct items times the window size, which is potentially very
high. In contrast, our algorithm tracks persistent items using much smaller space, while giving
up some accuracy.
There has been much work in estimating various properties of the frequency distribution
of stream items, including the frequency moments of a stream [13, 112, 70], heavy-hitters
[87, 50, 36, 84], and the entropy [83, 27, 94]. Unlike the set of persistent items, all the above
properties depend only on the frequency distribution of items in the stream – they are unaffected
by re-ordering of the stream elements, or by changing the times at which the elements arrive.
In contrast, the set of persistent items in a stream is affected by the time and order in which
elements arrive.
In a recent work on a temporal property of a stream, Chen et al [30] addressed the problem
of tracking long-duration flows from network streams. They identified flows for which the
difference of timestamps between the first and the last packet in the flow exceed some threshold
d. A flow might continue for a long duration and yet the total number of bytes sent in the flow
may not be high enough to be detected by the heavy-hitter algorithms; whereas some other
flow of shorter duration might qualify as a heavy-hitter because it sends many more bytes.
Clearly, a long-lived flow is not necessarily persistent.
2.6 Conclusion
We formulated the problem of detecting persistent items in a data stream. Our lower bound
result shows that an exact algorithm for the problem, which reports all persistent items, would
need a prohibitively high memory, and is therefore impractical. Subsequently, we presented an
approximate formulation of the problem that explores a tradeoff between space and accuracy
in identifying persistent items. Allocating more memory leads to more accurate answers and
this allows operators to tune their systems appropriately depending on the amount of resources
available.
By running simulations of both the naive (exact) and small space algorithms on a real as
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well as two synthetic traffic datasets with different skewness, we demonstrate that our algorithm
works very well in practice: for the real trace, it uses upto 85% less space than the naive (exact)
algorithm and incurs a false positive rate (and false negative rate) of less than 1% (and 4%
respectively) for typical values of the parameters. We also see that false positive rate never
exceeds 3% for any parameter setting, while the false negative rate stays below 5% for all but
the most aggressive thresholds for persistence. For the synthetic trace with low skewness, the
small-space algorithm uses upto 80% less space than the naive one, the false positive rate is
less than 2% and the false negative rate is about 4% for typical parameter values (e.g., α = 0.5
and  = 0.15). The maximum false positive rate is less than 3% for the real trace and the
synthetic trace with higher skewness. The empirical false positive and false negative rates,
for most parameters, are much better than the analytical bounds: and our experiment across
the three different datasets shows that the false positive rate improves for data with higher
skewness.
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CHAPTER 3. Identifying Correlated Heavy-Hitters over a Data Stream
In this chapter, we consider online mining of correlated heavy-hitters (CHH) from a data
stream. Given a stream of two-dimensional data, a correlated aggregate query first extracts a
substream by applying a predicate along a primary dimension, and then computes aggregates
along a secondary dimension. We consider queries of the following form: “In a stream S of (x, y)
tuples, on the substream H of all x values that are heavy-hitters, maintain those y values that
occur frequently with the x values in H”. This query arises naturally in situations where we
need to track not only the identity of frequently occurring items in a stream, but also additional
information associated with these items along other dimensions. Prior work on heavy-hitters
in streams have focused solely on identifying the heavy-hitters on a single dimensional stream,
and these yield little information about correlated heavy-hitters. We formulate an approximate
version of the CHH problem, and present an algorithm for approximately tracking CHHs on
a data stream. The algorithm is easy to implement and uses workspace which is orders of
magnitude smaller than the stream itself. We present provable guarantees on the maximum
error estimates, as well as experimental results that demonstrate the space-accuracy trade-off
on a large stream of IP packet headers from a backbone network link.
3.1 Introduction
Correlated aggregates ([15, 55, 37]) reveal interesting interactions among the different at-
tributes of a multi-dimensional dataset. They are useful when we are interested in finding an
aggregate on an attribute over a subset, where the subset is defined by a selection predicate
on a different attribute of the same dataset. On a stored database, a correlated aggregate can
be computed by considering one dimension at a time, using multiple passes through the data.
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However, for streaming data, we often do not have the luxury of making multiple passes over
the dataset, the data may be too large to store and it is desirable to have an algorithm that
works in a single pass through the data. Moreover, even the substream derived by applying
the query predicate along the primary dimension can be too large to store, let alone the whole
dataset.
We consider the identification of correlated heavy-hitters (CHHs) from massive data streams.
We first define the notion of a heavy-hitter on a data stream (this is considered in prior work,
such as [87, 89, 29, 35]), and then define our notion of correlated heavy-hitters. Given a se-
quence of single-dimensional records (a1, a2, . . . , aN ), where ai ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the frequency of
an item i is defined as |{aj |aj = i}|. Given a user-input threshold φ ∈ (0, 1), any data item i
whose frequency is at least φN is termed as a φ-heavy-hitter. We first consider the following
problem of exact identification of CHHs.
Problem 4 Exact Identification of Correlated Heavy Hitters. Given a data stream
S of (x, y) tuples of length N (x and y will henceforth be referred to as the “primary” and
the “secondary” dimensions, respectively), and two user-defined thresholds φ1 and φ2, where
0 < φ1 < 1 and 0 < φ2 < 1, identify all (d, s) tuples such that:
fd = |{(x, y) ∈ S : (x = d)}| > φ1N
and
fd,s = |{(x, y) ∈ S : (x = d) ∧ (y = s)}| > φ2fd
The above aggregate can be understood as follows. The elements d are heavy-hitters in the
traditional sense, on the stream formed by projecting along the primary dimension. For each
heavy-hitter d along the primary dimension, there is logically a (uni-dimensional) substream
Sd, consisting of all values along the secondary dimension, where the primary dimension equals
d. We require the tracking of all tuples (d, s) such that s is a heavy-hitter in Sd.
Many stream mining and monitoring problems on two-dimensional streams need the CHH
aggregate, and cannot be answered by independent aggregation along single dimensions. For
example, consider a network monitoring application, where a stream of (destination IP address,
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source IP address) pairs is being observed. The network monitor maybe interested not only
in tracking those destination IP addresses that receive a large fraction of traffic (heavy-hitter
destinations), but also in tracking those source IP addresses that send a large volume of traffic
to these heavy-hitter destinations. This cannot be done by independently tracking heavy-
hitters along the primary and the secondary dimensions. Note that in this application, we are
interested not only in the identity of the heavy-hitters, but also additional information on the
substream induced by the heavy-hitters.
In another example, in a stream of (server IP address, port number) tuples, identifying
the heavy-hitter server IP addresses will tell us which servers are popular, and identifying
frequent port numbers (independently) will tell us which applications are popular; but a network
manager maybe interested in knowing which applications are popular among the heavily loaded
servers, which can be retrieved using a CHH query. Such correlation queries are used for network
optimization and anomaly detection [39].
Another application is the recommendation system of a typical online shopping site, which
shows a buyer a list of the items frequently bought with the ones she has decided to buy.
Our algorithm can optimize the performance of such a system by parsing the transaction logs
and identifying the items that were bought commonly with the frequently purchased items.
If such information is stored in a cache with a small lookup time, then for most buyers, the
recommendation system can save the time to perform a query on the disk-resident data.
Similar to the above examples, in many stream monitoring applications, it is important to
track the heavy-hitters in the stream, but this monitoring should go beyond simple identification
of heavy-hitters, or tracking their frequencies, as is considered in most prior formulations of
heavy-hitter tracking such as [34, 87, 89, 29, 49]. In this work we initiate the study of tracking
additional properties of heavy-hitters by considering tracking of correlated heavy hitters.
3.1.1 Approximate CHH
It is easy to prove that exact identification of heavy-hitters in a single dimension is impos-
sible using limited space, and one pass through the input. Hence, the CHH problem is also
impossible to solve in limited space, using a single pass through the input. Due to this, we
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consider the following approximate version of the problem. We introduce additional approxi-
mation parameters, 1 and 2 (0 < 1 ≤ φ12 , 0 < 2 < φ2), which stand for the approximation
errors along the primary and the secondary dimensions, respectively. We seek an algorithm
that provides the following guarantees.
Problem 5 Approximate Identification of Correlated Heavy-Hitters. Given a data
stream S of (d, s) tuples of length N , thresholds φ1 and φ2:
1. Report any value d such that fd > φ1N as a heavy-hitter along the primary dimension.
2. No value d such that fd < (φ1 − 1)N , should be reported as a heavy-hitter along the
primary dimension.
3. For any value d reported above, report any value s along the secondary dimension such
that fd,s > φ2fd as a CHH.
4. For any value d reported above, no value s along the secondary dimension such that
fd,s < (φ2 − 2)fd should be reported as a CHH occurring alongwith d.
With this problem formulation, false positives are possible, but false negatives are not. In
other words, if a pair (d, s) is a CHH according to the definition in Problem 4, then it is a
CHH according to the definition in Problem 5, and will be returned by the algorithm. But
an algorithm for Problem 5 may return a pair (s, d) that are not exact CHHs, but whose
frequencies are close to the required thresholds.
3.1.2 Contributions
Our contributions are as follows.
• We introduce the notion of exact and approximate CHHs, and present a small-space ap-
proximation algorithm for identifying approximate CHHs in a single pass. Prior literature
on correlated aggregates have mostly focused on the correlated sum, and these techniques
are not applicable for CHH. Our algorithm for approximate CHH identification is based
on a nested application of the Misra-Gries algorithm [89].
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• We provide a provable guarantee on the approximation error. We show that there are no
false negatives, and the error in the false positives is controlled. When greater memory
is available, this error can be reduced. The space taken by the algorithm as well as the
approximation error of the algorithm depend on the sizes of two different data structures
within the algorithm. The total space taken by the sketch is minimized through solv-
ing a constrained optimization problem that minimizes the total space taken subject to
providing the user-desired error guarantees.
• We present results from our simulations on a stream of more than 1.4 billion (50 GB
trace) anonymized packet headers from an OC48 link (collected by CAIDA [25]). We
compared the performance of our small-space algorithm with a slow, but exact algorithm
that goes through the input data in multiple passes. Our experiments revealed that even
with a space budget of a few megabytes, the average error statistics of our algorithm were
very small, showing that it is a viable algorithm in practice.
Along each dimension our algorithm maintains frequency estimates of mostly those values
(or pairs of values) that occur frequently. For example, for every destination that sends a
significant fraction of traffic on a link, we maintain mostly the sources that occur frequently
along with this destination. Note that the set of heavy-hitters along the primary dimension can
change as the stream elements arrive, and this influences the set of CHHs along the secondary
dimension. For example, if an erstwhile heavy-hitter destination d no longer qualifies as a
heavy-hitter with increase in N (and hence gets rejected from the sketch), then a source s
occurring with d should also be discarded from the sketch. This interplay between different
dimensions has to be handled carefully during algorithm design.
Roadmap: The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present related
work, followed by the Algorithm in Section 3.3, and its proof of correctness in Section 3.4.
The analysis of the space complexity and the setting of certain important parameters of the
algorithm is discussed in Section 3.5, followed by experimental results in Section 4.5.
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3.2 Related Work
In the data streaming literature, there is a significant body of work on correlated aggregates
([15, 55, 37]), as well as on the identification of heavy hitters ([87, 89, 29, 35]). See [32] for a
recent overview of work on heavy-hitter identification. None of these works consider correlated
heavy-hitters.
Estan et al. [48] and Zhang et al. [118] have independently studied the problem of iden-
tifying heavy-hitters from multi-dimensional packet streams, but they both define a multidi-
mensional tuple as a heavy-hitter if it occurs more than φN times in the stream, N being the
stream size – the interplay across different dimensions is not considered.
Gehrke et al [55] addressed correlated aggregates where the aggregate along the primary
dimension was an extremum (min or max) or the average, and the aggregate along the secondary
dimension was sum or count. For example, given a stream S of (x, y) tuples, their algorithm
could approximately answer queries of the following form: “Return the sum of y-values from
S where the corresponding x-values are more than twice the minimum of all x-values”. They
maintained a data structure called adaptive histograms, but these did not come with provable
guarantees on performance. Ananthakrishna et al [15] presented algorithms with provable error
bounds for correlated sum and count. Given a stream S of (x, y) tuples, their algorithms could
answer, approximately, prefix-range queries of the following form: “Return the sum (or count)
of y-values from S where the corresponding x-values are at most x∗”. Here, x∗ is a value
that is presented at query time. Their solution was based on the quantile summary of [62].
Cormode, Tirthapura, and Xu [37] presented algorithms for maintaining the more general case
of time-decayed correlated aggregates, where the stream elements were weighted based on the
time of arrival. This work also addressed the “sum” aggregate. A recent work by Tirthapura
and Woodruff [103] presents a general method for estimating correlated aggregates for a class
of aggregates that satisfy a certain set of conditions.
The above works differ from our work in the following respect. In our case the constraint
on the x dimension is of the form “the frequency of the x value selected is large”, while the
constraints in the previous works [55, 15, 37, 103] are of the form x > x∗ or x < x∗. These
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two types of constraints require significantly different techniques. For instance in the case of
the constraint of the form x > x∗, we know that the interval of x that is of interest always has
the right endpoint equal to the maximum x value; and the techniques in [103, 37] make use of
this by storing summaries over a nested sequence of intervals with the right endpoint equal to
the maximum x value. But the x values of interest in our case do not necessarily even form a
contiguous subsequence of the universe.
The heavy-hitter literature has usually focused on the following problem. Given a sequence
of elements A = (a1, a2, . . . , aN ) and a user-input threshold φ ∈ (0, 1), find data items that
occur more than φN times in A. Misra and Gries [89] presented a deterministic algorithm
for this problem, with space complexity being O( 1φ), time complexity for updating the sketch
with the arrival of each element being O(log 1φ), and query time complexity being O(
1
φ). For
exact identification of heavy-hitters, their algorithm works in two passes. For approximate
heavy-hitters, their algorithm used only one pass through the sequence, and had the following
approximation guarantee. Assume user-input threshold φ and approximation error  < φ. Note
that for an online algorithm, N is the number of elements received so far.
• All items whose frequencies exceed φN are output. i.e. there are no false negatives.
• No item with frequency less than (φ− )N is output.
Demaine et al [43] and Karp et al [71] improved the sketch update time per element of the
Misra-Gries algorithm from O(log 1φ) to O(1), using an advanced data structure combining a
hashtable, a linked list and a set of doubly-linked lists. Manku and Motwani [87] presented a
deterministic “Lossy Counting” algorithm that offered the same approximation guarantees as
the one-pass approximate Misra-Gries algorithm; but their algorithm required O(1 log (N))
space in the worst case. For our problem, we chose to extend the Misra-Gries algorithm as it
takes asymptotically less space than [87].
3.3 Algorithm
Our algorithm is based on a nested application of an algorithm for identifying frequent
items from an one-dimensional stream, due to Misra and Gries [89]. We first describe the
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Misra-Gries algorithm (henceforth called the MG algorithm). Suppose we are given an input
stream a1, a2, . . ., and an error threshold , 0 <  < 1. The algorithm maintains a data structure
D that contains at most 1 (key, count) pairs. On receiving an item ai, it is first checked if
a tuple (ai, ·) already exists in D. If it does, ai’s count is incremented by 1; otherwise, the
pair (ai, 1) is added to D. Now, if adding a new pair to D makes |D| exceed 1 , then for each
(key, count) pair in D, the count is decremented by one; and any key whose count falls to zero
is discarded. This ensures at least the key which was most recently added (with a count of
one) would get discarded, so the size of D, after processing all pairs, would come down to 1
or less. Thus, the space requirement of this algorithm is O(1 ). The data structure D can be
implemented using hashtables or height-balanced binary search trees. At the end of one pass
through the data, the MG algorithm maintains the frequencies of keys in the stream with an
error of no more than n, where n is the size of the stream. The MG algorithm can be used in
exact identification of heavy hitters from a data stream using two passes through the data.
In the scenario of limited memory, the MG algorithm can be used to solve problem 4 in
three passes through the data, as follows. We first describe a four pass algorithm. In the first
two passes, heavy-hitters along the primary dimension are identified, using memory O(1/φ1).
Note that this is asymptotically the minimum possible memory requirement of any algorithm for
identifying heavy-hitters, since the size of output can be Ω
(
1
φ1
)
. In the next two passes, heavy-
hitters along the secondary dimension are identified for each heavy-hitter along the primary
dimension. This takes space O
(
1
φ2
)
for each heavy-hitter along the primary dimension. The
total space cost is O
(
1
φ1φ2
)
, which is optimal, since the output could be Ω
(
1
φ1φ2
)
elements.
The above algorithm can be converted into a three pass exact algorithm by combining the
second and third passes.
The high-level idea behind our single-pass algorithm for Problem 5 is as follows. The MG
algorithm for an one-dimensional stream, can be viewed as maintaining a small space “sketch”
of data that (approximately) maintains the frequencies of each distinct item d along the primary
dimension; of course, these frequency estimates are useful only for items that have very high
frequencies. For each distinct item d along the primary dimension, apart from maintaining
its frequency estimate fˆd, our algorithm maintains an embedded MG sketch of the substream
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Sd induced by d, i.e. Sd = {(x, y)|((x, y) ∈ S) ∧ (x = d)}. The embedded sketch is a set of
tuples of the form (s, fˆd,s), where s is an item that occurs in Sd, and fˆd,s is an estimate of the
frequency of the pair (d, s) in S (or equivalently, the frequency of s in Sd). While the actions
on fˆd (increment, decrement, discard) depend on how d and the other items appear in S, the
actions on fˆd,s depend on the items appearing in Sd. Further, the sizes of the tables that are
maintained have an important effect on both the correctness and the space complexity of the
algorithm.
We now present a more detailed description. The algorithm maintains a table H, which is
a set of tuples (d, fˆd, Hd), where d is a value along the primary dimension, fˆd is the estimated
frequency of d in the stream, and Hd is another table that stores the values of the secondary
attribute that occur with d. Hd stores its content in the form of (key, count) pairs, where the
keys are values (s) along the secondary attribute and the counts are the frequencies of s in Sd,
denoted as fˆd,s, alongwith d.
The maximum number of tuples in H is s1, and the maximum number of tuples in each
Hd is s2. The values of s1 and s2 depend on the parameters φ1, φ2, 1, 2, and are decided at
the start of the algorithm. Since s1 and s2 effect the space complexity of the algorithm, as
well as the correctness guarantees provided by it, their values are set based on an optimization
procedure, as described in Section 3.5.
The formal description is presented in Algorithms 8, 9 and 10. Before a stream element is
received, Algorithm 8 Sketch-Initialize is invoked to initialize the data structures. Algorithm
9 Sketch-Update is invoked to update the data structure as each stream tuple (x, y) arrives.
Algorithm 10 Report-CHH is used to answer queries when a user asks for the CHHs in the
stream so far.
On receiving an element (x, y) of the stream, the following three scenarios may arise. We
explain the action taken in each.
1. If x is present in H, and y is present in Hx, then both fˆx and fˆx,y are incremented.
2. If x is present in H, but y is not in Hx, then y is added to Hx with a count of 1. If this
addition causes |Hx| to exceed its space budget s2, then for each (key, count) pair in Hx,
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the count is decremented by 1 (similar to the MG algorithm). If the count of any key
falls to zero, the key is dropped from Hx. Note that after this operation, the size of Hx
will be at most s2.
3. If x is not present in H, then an entry is created for x in H by setting fˆx to 1, and by
initializing Hx with the pair (y, 1). If adding this entry causes |H| to exceed s1, then
for each d ∈ H, fd is decremented by 1. If the decrement causes fˆd to be zero, then we
simply discard the entry for d from H.
Otherwise, when fd is decremented, the algorithm keeps the sum of the ˆfd,s counts within
Hd equal to fd; the detailed correctness is proved in Section 3.5. To achieve this, an
arbitrary key s is selected from Hd such that such that fˆd,s > 0, and fˆd,s is decremented
by 1. If fˆd,s falls to zero, s is discarded from Hd.
Algorithm 8: Sketch-Initialize(φ1, φ2, 1, 2)
Input: Threshold for primary dimension φ1; Threshold for secondary dimension φ2;
Tolerance for primary dimension 1; Tolerance for secondary dimension 2
1 H ← Φ
2 Set s1 and s2 as described in Section 3.5.
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Algorithm 9: Sketch-Update(x, y)
Input: Element along primary dimension x; Element along secondary dimension y
1 if x ∈ H then
2 fˆx ← fˆx + 1;
3 if y ∈ Hx then
/* Both x and y are present */
4 Increment fˆx,y in Hx by 1;
5 else
/* x ∈ H, but y 6∈ Hx */
6 Add the tuple (y, 1) to Hx;
7 if |Hx| > s2 then
8 foreach (s, fˆd,s) ∈ Hx do
9 fˆd,s ← fˆd,s − 1;
10 if fˆd,s = 0 then
11 discard (s, fˆd,s) from Hx;
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 else
/* Neither of x or y is present */
17 Hx ← Φ; Add (y, 1) to Hx; fˆx ← 1;
18 if |H| > s1 then
19 foreach d ∈ H do
20 fˆd ← fˆd − 1;
21 if there exists s such that fˆd,s > 0 then
22 Choose an arbitrary (s, fˆd,s) ∈ Hd such that fˆd,s > 0;
23 fˆd,s ← fˆd,s − 1;
24 if fˆd,s = 0 then
25 discard (s, fˆd,s) from Hd;
26 end
27 end
28 if fˆd = 0 then
29 Discard (d,Hd) from H;
30 end
31 end
32 end
33 end
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Algorithm 10: Report-CHH(N)
Input: Size of the stream N
1 foreach d ∈ H do
2 if fˆd ≥ (φ1 − 1s1 )N then
3 Report d as a frequent value of the primary attribute;
4 foreach (s, fˆd,s) ∈ Hd do
5 if fˆd,s ≥ (φ2 − 1s2 )fˆd − Ns1 then
6 Report s as a CHH occurring with d;
7 end
8 end
9 end
10 end
3.4 Correctness
In this section, we show the correctness of the algorithm, subject to the following constraints
on s1 and s2. In Section 3.5, we assign values to s1 and s2 in such a manner that the space
taken by the data structure is minimized.
Constraint 3.4.1
1
s1
≤ 1
Constraint 3.4.2
1
s2
+
1 + φ2
s1(φ1 − 1) ≤ 2
Consider the state of the data structure after a stream S of length N has been observed.
Consider a value d of the primary attribute, and s of the secondary attribute. Let fd and fd,s
be defined as in Section 3.1. Our analysis focuses on the values of variables fˆd and fˆd,s, which
are updated in Algorithms 9 and used in Algorithm 10. For convenience, if d is not present in
H then we define fˆd = 0. Similarly, if d is not present in H, or if (d, s) is not present in Hd,
then we define fˆd,s = 0.
Lemma 3.4.1
fˆd ≥ fd − N
s1
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Proof: The total number of increments in the s1 counters that keep track of the counts of the
different values of the primary attribute is N . Each time there is a decrement to fˆd (in Line 20
of Algorithm 9), s1 + 1 different counters are decremented. The total number of decrements,
however, cannot be more than the total number of increments, and hence is at most N . So the
number of times the block of lines 19-31 in Algorithm 9 gets executed is at most Ns1+1 <
N
s1
. We
also know that fˆd is incremented exactly fd times, hence the final value of fˆd is greater than
fd − Ns1 .
Lemma 3.4.2 Assume that Constraint is true. If fd > φ1N , then d is reported by Algorithm 10
as a frequent item. Further, if fd < (φ1 − 1)N , then d is not reported as a frequent item.
Proof: Suppose fd ≥ φ1N . From Lemma 3.4.1, fˆd ≥ fd − 1N ≥ φ1N − 1N . Hence
Algorithm 10 will report d (see Lines 2 and 3). Next, suppose that fd < (φ1 − 1)N . Since
fˆd ≤ fd, Algorithm 10 will not report d as a frequent item.
Lemma 3.4.3 ∑
(s,·)∈Hd
fˆd,s ≤ fˆd
Proof: Let Σd =
∑
(s,·)∈Hd fˆd,s. Let C(n) denote the condition Σd ≤ fˆd after n stream
elements have been observed. We prove C(n) by induction on n. The base case is when n = 0,
and in this case, fˆd,s = fˆd = 0 for all d, s, and C(0) is trivially true. For the inductive step,
assume that C(k) is true, for k ≥ 0. Consider a new element that arrives, say (x, y), and
consider Algorithm 9 applied on this element. We consider four possible cases.
(I) If x = d, and d ∈ H, then fˆd is incremented by 1, and it can be verified (Lines 3-11)
that Σd increases by at most 1 (and may even decrease). Thus C(k + 1) is true.
(II) If x = d, and d 6∈ H, then initially, fˆd and Σd are both 1 (line 17). If |H| ≤ s1, then
both fˆd and Σd remain 1, and C(k+ 1) is true. Suppose |H| > s1, then both fˆd and Σd will go
down to 0, since Hd will be discarded from H. Thus C(k + 1) is true.
(III) If x 6= d, and x ∈ H, then neither fˆd nor Σd change.
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(IV) Finally, if x 6= d and x 6∈ H, then it is possible that fˆd is decremented (line 20). In
this case, if Σd > 0, then Σd is also decremented (line 22), and C(k+ 1) is satisfied. If Σd = 0,
then C(k + 1) is trivially satisfied since fˆd ≥ 0.
Lemma 3.4.4 Subject to Constraint , fˆd,s ≥ fd,s − 2fd − 1N .
Proof: Note that each time the tuple (d, s) occurs in the stream, fˆd,s is incremented in
Algorithm 9. But fˆd,s can be less than fd,s because of decrements in Lines 9 or 23 in Algorithm
9. We consider these two cases separately.
Let Σd =
∑
(s,·)∈Hd fˆd,s. For decrements in Line 9, we observe that each time this line is
executed, Σd reduces by s2 + 1. From Lemma 3.4.3, we know that Σd ≤ fˆd ≤ fd. Thus the
total number of times fˆd,s is decremented due to Line 9 is no more than
fd
s2+1
. From Constraint
3.4.2, we know 1s2 < 2, and
fd
s2+1
< 2fd.
For decrements in Line 23, we observe that fˆd,s is decremented in Line 23 no more than
the number of decrements to fˆd, which was bounded by Ns1 in Lemma 3.4.1. From Constraint
3.4.4, this is no more than 1N .
Lemma 3.4.5 For any value d that gets reported in line 3 of Algorithm 10, any value s of
the secondary attribute that occurs with d such that fd,s > φ2fd, will be identified by line 6 of
Algorithm 10 as a CHH occurring alongwith d.
Proof: From Lemma 3.4.4,
fˆd,s ≥ fd,s − 2fd − 1N
> φ2fd − 2fd − 1N
= (φ2 − 2)fd − 1N
≥ (φ2 − 2)fˆd − 1N
where we have used fd ≥ fˆd. The lemma follows since (φ2 − 2)fˆd − 1N is the threshold
used in line 5 of Algorithm 10 to report a value of the secondary attribute as a CHH.
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Lemma 3.4.6 Under Constraints 3.4.4 and 3.4.2, for any value of d that is reported as a
heavy-hitter along the primary dimension, then for a value s′ along the secondary dimension,
if fd,s′ < (φ2 − 2)fd, then the pair (d, s′) will not be reported as a CHH.
Proof: We will prove the contrapositive of the above statement. Consider a value s such that
(d, s) is reported as a CHH. Then, we show that fd,s ≥ (φ2 − 2)fd. If (d, s) is reported, then
it must be true that fˆd,s ≥ (φ2 − 1s2 )fˆd − Ns1 (Algorithm 10, line 5). Using fd,s ≥ fˆd,s, and
fˆd ≥ fd − Ns1 , we get:
fd,s ≥ fˆd,s
≥
(
φ2 − 1
s2
)
fˆd − N
s1
≥
(
φ2 − 1
s2
)(
fd − N
s1
)
− N
s1
=
(
φ2 − 1
s2
)
fd − N
s1
(
1 + φ2 − 1
s2
)
≥
(
φ2 − 1
s2
)
fd − fd(φ1 − 1)s1
(
1 + φ2 − 1
s2
)
(since d gets reported, by Lemma 3.4.2, fd ≥ (φ1 − 1)N ⇒ N ≤ fdφ1−1 )
=
(
φ2 − 1
s2
− 1
(φ1 − 1)s1
(
1 + φ2 − 1
s2
))
fd
≥ fd(φ2 − 2)(using Constraint 3.4.2)
Lemmas 3.4.6, 3.4.5, and 3.4.2 together yield the following.
Theorem 3.4.1 If Constraints 3.4.4 and 3.4.2 are satisfied, then Algorithms 8, 9 and 10
satisfy all the four requirements of Problem 5.
3.5 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the space complexity of the algorithm. In Theorem 3.4.1, we
showed that the Algorithms 9 and 10 solve the Approximate CHH detection problem, as long
as constraints 3.4.4 and 3.4.2 are satisfied.
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Space Complexity in terms of s1 and s2. In our algorithm, we maintain at most s2
counters for each of the (at most) s1 distinct values of the primary attribute in H. Hence, the
size of our sketch is O(s1 + s1s2) = O(s1s2). We now focus on the following question. What is
the setting of s1 and s2 so that the space complexity of the sketch is minimized while meeting
the constraints required for correctness.?
Lemma 3.5.1 Let α =
(
1+φ2
φ1−1
)
. Subject to constraints 3.4.4 and 3.4.2, the space of the data
structure is minimized by the following settings of s1 and s2.
• If 1 ≥ 22α , then s1 = 2α and s2 = 22 . In this case, the space complexity is O
(
1
(φ1−1)22
)
.
• If 1 < 22α , then s1 = 11 , and s2 = 12−α1 . In this case, the space complexity is O( 112 ).
Proof: Let σ1 = 1s1 , σ2 =
1
s2
. The problem is now to maximize σ1σ2. Constraints 3.4.4 and
3.4.2 can be rewritten as follows.
• Constraint 1: σ1 ≤ 1
• Constraint 2: ασ1 + σ2 ≤ 2
First, we note that any assignment (σ1, σ2) = (x, y) that maximizes σ1σ2 must be tight
on Constraint 2, i.e. αx + y = 2. This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose not, and
αx + y < 2, and xy is the maximum possible. Now, there is a solution σ1 = x, and σ2 = y′,
such that y < y′, and Constraints 1 and 2 are still satisfied. Further, xy′ > xy, showing that
the solution (x, y) is not optimal.
Thus, we have:
σ2 = 2 − ασ1 (3.1)
Thus the problem has reduced to: Maximize f(σ1) = σ1 (2 − ασ1) subject to σ1 ≤ 1.
Consider
f ′(σ1) = 2 − 2ασ1
We consider two cases.
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• Case I: 1 ≥ 22α .
Setting f ′(σ1) = 0, we find that the function reaches a fixed point at σ1 = 22α . At this
point, f ′′(σ1) = −2α, which is negative. Hence f(σ1) is maximized at σ1 = 22α . We note
that this value of σ1 does not violate Constraint 1, and hence this is a feasible solution.
In this case, the optimal settings are: σ1 = 22α and σ2 =
2
2 . Thus s1 =
2α
 and s2 =
2
2
.
The space complexity is O( 1σ1σ2 ) = O(
4α
22
).
• Case II: 1 < 22α
The function f(σ1) is increasing for σ1 from 0 to 22α . Hence this will be maximized at
the point σ1 = 1. Thus, in this case the optimal settings are σ1 = 1, and σ2 = 2−α1.
Thus, s1 = 11 , and s2 =
1
2−α1 . The space complexity is: O(
1
1(2−α1)).
We note that since 2 > 2α1, we have (2 − α1) > 22 , and hence the space complexity
is O( 112 ).
Lemma 3.5.2 The time taken to update the sketch on receiving each element of the stream is
O(max(s1, s2)).
Proof: In processing an element (x, y) of the stream by Algorithm 9, the following three
scenarios may arise.
1. x is present in H, and y is present in Hx. We implemented the tables as hash tables,
hence the time taken to look up and increment fˆx from H and fˆx,y from Hx is O(1).
2. x is present in H, but y is not in Hx. If the size of Hx exceeds its space budget s2, then,
the time taken to decrement the frequencies of all the stored values of the secondary
attribute is O(s2).
3. x is not present in H. If the size of H exceeds its space budget s1, then the time taken
to decrement the frequencies of all the stored values of the primary attribute is O(s1).
The time complexity to update the sketch on receiving each element is the maximum of these
three, which establishes the claim.
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3.6 Experiments
We simulated our algorithm in C++, using the APIs offered by the Standard Template
Library [10], on anonymized packet header traces collected by CAIDA [25] in both directions
of an OC48 link. We conducted the experiments over two machines: one had Cygwin 5.1 (on
Windows XP) with 3 GHz Pentium dual-core processor and 2 GB RAM, and the other had
Red Hat Linux 5.3 (kernel version 2.6.18) with a 2.4 GHz Pentium 4 processor and 1 GB RAM.
We used windump [11] on the first machine in conjunction with our custom Java application
to extract the source IP address, the destination IP address, the source port number and the
destination port number from the .pcap files.
Objective: The goal of the simulation was threefold: first, to learn about typical frequency
distributions in real two-dimensional network traffic streams; second, to illustrate the reduc-
tion in space and time cost achievable by the small-space algorithm in practice; and finally, to
demonstrate how the space budget (and hence, the allocated memory) influences the accuracy
of our algorithm in practice.
For the first objective, we ran a naive algorithm on a smaller dataset of 248 million (des-
tination IP, source IP) tuples, where all the distinct destination IPs were stored, and for each
distinct destination IP, all the distinct source IPs were stored. We identified (exactly) the
frequent values along both the dimensions for φ = 0.001 and ψ = 0.001. Only 43 of the 1.2
million distinct destination IPs were reported as heavy-hitters. For the secondary dimension,
we ranked the heavy-hitter destination IPs based on the number of distinct source IPs they
co-occurred with, and the number of distinct source IPs for the top eight are shown in Figure
3.1. All these heavy-hitter destination IPs co-occurred with 9,000-18,000 distinct source IPs,
whereas, for all of them, the number of co-occurring heavy-hitter source IPs was in the range
20-200 (note that the Y-axis in Figure 3.1 is in log scale). This shows that the distribution
of the primary attribute values, as well as that of the secondary attribute values for a given
value of the primary attribute, are very skewed, and hence call for the design of small-space
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approximation algorithms like ours.
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Figure 3.1: On the X-axis are the ranks of the eight (heavy-hitter) destination IPs, that co-appear
with maximum number of distinct source IPs. For each destination IP, the Y-axis shows 1) the number
of distinct source IPs co-occurring with it, 2) the number of heavy-hitter destination IPs co-appearing
with it. Note that the Y-axis is logarithmic.
The second objective was accomplished by comparing the space and time costs of the naive
algorithm as above (on the same dataset), with those of the small-space algorithm, run with
s1 = 3000 and s2 = 2000 (Figure 3.2). We defined the space cost as the distinct number
of (dstIP, srcIP) tuples stored (
∑
d |Hd|), which is 34 times higher for the naive algorithm
compared to the small-space one. Also, the naive algorithm took more than twice as much
time to run the small-space one.
For the third objective, we tested the small-space algorithm on two datasets (with different
values of s1 and s2): one with 1.4 billion (destination IP, source IP) tuples, and the other with
20.7 million (destination port, destination IP) tuples - we will refer to these two datasets as
“IPPair” and “PortIP” respectively. To test the accuracy of our small-space algorithm, we de-
rived the “ground truth”, i.e., a list of the actual heavy-hitters along both the dimensions along
with their exact frequencies, by employing a four-pass variant of the Misra-Gries algorithm (as
discussed in Section 3.1.1).
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of space (left) and time (right) costs of the naive and the small-space algorithms.
The space is the total number of distinct tuples stored, summed over all distinct destination IP addresses.
The time is the number of hours to process the 248 million records. Note that the Y-axis for the left
graph is logarithmic.
Observations: We define the error statistic in estimating the frequency of a heavy-hitter
value d of the primary attribute as fd−fˆdN , and in Figures 3.3 and 3.5, for each value of s1, we
plot the maximum and the average of this error statistic over all the heavy-hitter values of the
primary attribute. We observed that both the maximum and the average fell sharply as s1
increased. Even by using a space budget (s1) as low as 1000, the maximum error statistic was
only 0.09% for “IPPair” and 0.04% for “PortIP”.
The graphs in Figures 3.4 and 3.6 show the results of running our small-space algorithm
with different values of s1 as well as s2. We define the error statistic in estimating the frequency
of a CHH s (that occurs alongwith a heavy-hitter primary attribute d) as fd,s−fˆd,sfd , and for each
combination of s1 and s2, we plot the theoretical maximum, the experimental maximum and
the average of this error statistic over all CHH attributes. Here also, we observed that both
the maximum and the average fall sharply as s1 increases. However, for a fixed value of s1, as
we increased the value of s2, the maximum did not change at all (for either of “IPPair” and
“PortIP”), and the average did not reduce too much - this becomes evident if we compare the
readings of the three sub-figures in Figures 3.4 or 3.6, which differ in their values of s2, for
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Figure 3.3: Error statistic in estimating the frequencies of the heavy-hitter destination IPs in “IPPair”.
The graph shows the theoretical maximum ( 1s1 ), the experimental maximum and the experimental
average.
identical values of s1. The possible reason is the number of CHHs being very low compared to
the number of distinct values of the secondary attribute occurring with a heavy-hitter primary
attribute, as we have pointed out in Figure 3.1 for “IPPair”. However, this is good because it
implies that in practice, setting s2 as low as 1ψ should be enough.
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Figure 3.4: Error statistic in estimating the frequencies of the CHH source IPs in “IPPair”, for s2 =
1100, 1500 and 2000 respectively. The graph shows the theoretical maxima
(
1
φs1
+ 1s2
)
, the experimental
maxima and the experimental average.
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Figure 3.5: Error statistic in estimating the frequencies of the heavy-hitter destination ports from
“PortIP”
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Figure 3.6: Error statistic in estimating the frequencies of the CHH destination IPs in “PortIP”. The
three graphs are for s2 = 1100, s2 = 1500 and s2 = 2000 respectively.
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3.7 Conclusion and Future Work
For two-dimensional data streams, we presented a small-space approximation algorithm to
identify the heavy-hitters along the secondary dimension from the substreams induced by the
heavy-hitters along the primary. We theoretically studied the relationship between the maxi-
mum errors in the frequency estimates of the heavy-hitters and the space budgets; computed
the minimum space requirement along the two dimensions for user-given error bounds; and
tested our algorithm to show the space-accuracy tradeoff for both the dimensions.
Identifying the heavy-hitters along any one dimension allows us to split the original stream
into several important substreams; and take a closer look at each one to identify the properties
of the heavy-hitters. In future, we plan to work on computing other statistics of the heavy-
hitters. For example, as we have already discussed in Section 4.5, our experiments with the naive
algorithm (on both the datasets) revealed that the number of distinct secondary attribute values
varied quite significantly across the different (heavy-hitter) values of the primary attribute.
For any such data with high variance, estimating the variance in small space [19, 116] is an
interesting problem in itself. Moreover, for data with high variance, the simple arithmetic mean
is not an ideal central measure, so finding different quantiles, once again in small space, can be
another problem worth studying.
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CHAPTER 4. Identifying Frequent Items in a Network using Gossip
In this chapter, we present algorithms for identifying frequently occurring items in a large
distributed data set. Our algorithms use gossip as the underlying communication mechanism,
and do not rely on any central control, or on an underlying network structure, such as a
spanning tree. Instead, nodes repeatedly select a random partner and exchange data with the
partner. If this process continues for a (short) period of time, the desired results are computed,
with probabilistic guarantees on the accuracy. Our algorithm for identifying frequent items is
built by layering a novel small space “sketch” of data over a gossip-based data dissemination
mechanism. We prove that the algorithm identifies the frequent items with high probability,
and provide bounds on the time till convergence. To our knowledge, this is the first work on
identifying frequent items using gossip.
4.1 Introduction
We are increasingly faced with data-intensive decentralized systems, such as large scale
peer-to-peer networks, server farms with tens of thousands of machines, and large wireless
sensor networks. With such large networks comes increasing unpredictability; the networks are
constantly changing, due to nodes joining and leaving, or due to node and link failures. Gossip
is a type of communication mechanism that is ideally suited for distributed computation on
such unstable, large networks. Gossip-based distributed protocols do not assume any underlying
structure in the network, such as a spanning tree, and hence, there is no overhead of sub-network
formation and maintenance. A gossip protocol proceeds in many “rounds”. In each round, a
node contacts a few randomly chosen nodes in the system and exchanges information with
them. The randomization inherently provides robustness, and surprisingly, often leads to fast
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convergence times. The use of gossip-based protocols for data dissemination and aggregation
in distributed systems was first proposed by Demers et al. [44].
We consider the problem of identifying frequent items in a distributed data set, using gossip.
Consider a large peer-to-peer network that is distributing content, such as news or software
updates. Suppose that the nodes in the network wish to track the identities of the most
frequently accessed items in the network. The relevant data for tracking this aggregate are
the frequencies of accesses of different items. However, this data is distributed throughout the
network – in fact, even the number of accesses to a single item may not be available at any single
point in the network. Our algorithm can be used to track the most frequently accessed items in
a low-overhead, decentralized manner, without having to aggregate the frequencies of accesses
at any central location. Another application of tracking frequent items is in the detection of
a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, where many malicious nodes may team up to
simultaneously send excessive traffic towards a single victim (typically a web server), so that
legitimate clients are denied service. Detecting a DDoS attack is equivalent to finding that
the total number of accesses to some server has exceeded a threshold. A distributed frequent
items algorithm can help by tracking the most frequently accessed web servers in a distributed
manner, and noting if these frequencies are abnormally large. With a gossip-based algorithm
this computation can proceed in a totally decentralized manner.
We consider two versions of the problem, one with a relative threshold on the frequency, and
the other with an absolute threshold on the frequency. In the relative threshold version, the
task is to identify all items whose frequency of occurrence is more than a certain fraction of the
total size of the data, where the fraction (the relative threshold) is a user-defined parameter. In
the absolute threshold version, the task is to identify all items whose frequency of occurrence
is at least an absolute number (the absolute threshold), which is a user-defined parameter. In
a distributed dynamic network, these two problems turn out to be rather different from each
other.
Our algorithms work without explicitly tabulating the frequencies of different items at any
single place in the network. Instead, the distributed data is represented by a small space
“sketch” that is propagated and updated via gossip. A sketch is a space-efficient representation
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of the input, which is specific to the aggregate being computed, and captures the essence of the
data for our purposes. The space taken by the sketch can be tuned as a function of the desired
accuracy. A complication with gossip is that since it is an unstructured form of communication,
it is possible for the same data item to be inserted into the sketch multiple times as the sketch
propagates. Due to this, a technical requirement on the sketch is that it should be able to
handle duplicate insertions, i.e. it should be duplicate-insensitive. If the gossip proceeds long
enough, the sketch can be used to identify all items whose frequency exceeds the user defined
threshold. At the same time, items whose popularity is significantly below the threshold will
be omitted (again, with high probability).
Contributions. The contributions of this work are as follows:
• We present randomized algorithms for identifying frequent items using gossip, for both
the relative and absolute threshold versions of the problem.
• For each algorithm, we present a rigorous analysis of the correctness, time till convergence,
and the communication overhead. Our analysis shows that these algorithms converge
quickly, and can maintain frequent items in a network with a reasonable communication
overhead.
• We present results from our simulations on synthetic data sets. We observed in our
simulations that the convergence time and the communication overhead were both much
lower than the theoretically guaranteed predictions.
To our knowledge, this is the first work on identifying frequent items in a distributed data
set using gossip.
With a gossip protocol, communication is inherently randomized, and a node can never
be certain that the results on hand are correct. However, the longer the protocol runs, the
closer the results get to the correct answer, and we are able to quantify the time taken till the
protocol converges to the correct answer, with high probability. Gossip algorithms are suitable
for applications which can tolerate such relaxed consistency guarantees. Examples include
a network monitoring application, which is running in the background and is maintaining
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statistics about frequently requested data items, or the most frequently observed data in a
distributed system. In such an application, an exact answer may not be required, and an
approximate answer may suffice.
4.1.1 Related Work
Demers et al. [44] were the first to provide a formal treatment of gossip protocols (or
“epidemic algorithms” as they called them) for data dissemination. Kempe and Kleinberg
[74] analyzed the influence of the underlying gossip mechanism on the design of gossip-based
protocols, and explored the limitations of uniform gossip in solving the nearest resource location
problem. Kempe, Dobra and Gehrke [73] proposed algorithms for computing the sum, average,
approximately uniform random sample and quantiles using uniform gossip. Their algorithm
for quantiles are based on their algorithm for the sum – they choose a random element in the
data, and count the number of elements that are greater and lesser than the chosen element,
and recurse on smaller data sets until the quantile is found. Thus their algorithms need many
instances of “sum” computations to converge before the quantile is found. A similar approach
could potentially be used to find frequent items using gossip. In contrast, our algorithms are
not based on repeated computation of the sum, and converge faster.
Much recent work [21, 22, 92] has focused on computing “separable functions” using gossip.
A separable function is one that can be expressed as the sum of individual functions of the
node inputs. For example, the function “count” is separable, and so is the function “sum”.
However, the set of frequent items is not a separable function. Hence, these techniques do
not apply to our problem. There is much other work on the computation of basic aggregates,
we list a few representative ones here. Kashyap et al. [72] proposed algorithms for gossip
with flexible tradeoffs between the number of rounds and the number of messages transmitted.
Dimakis, Sarwate and Wainwright [45] consider the problem of computing the average over
random geometric graphs with location-aware nodes, combining uniform gossip with greedy
geographic routing. Deb, Medard and Choute [41] used network coding along with uniform
gossip to speed up the dissemination of k messages in the network.
The problem of identifying frequent items in data has been extensively studied [89, 87, 71]
87
in the database, data streams and network monitoring communities (where frequent items are
often called “heavy-hitters”). The early work in this is due to Misra and Gries [89], who pro-
posed a deterministic algorithm to identify frequent items in a stream in small space, followed
by Manku and Motwani [87], who gave randomized and deterministic algorithms for the same
problem. The above were algorithms for a centralized setting.
In a distributed setting, Cao and Wang [26] proposed an algorithm to find the top-k items,
where they first made a lower-bound estimate for the kth value, and then used the estimate as a
threshold to prune away items which should not qualify as top-k. Zhao et al. [119] proposed a
sampling-based and a counting-sketch-based scheme to identify globally frequent items. Manjhi
et al. [86] present an algorithm for finding frequent items on distributed streams, through
a tree-based aggregation. Venkataraman et al. [110] present an algorithm for identifying
“superspreaders” or “heavy distinct hitters” in a network data stream. Keralapura, Cormode
and Ramamirtham [75] proposed an algorithm for continuously maintaining the frequent items
over a network of nodes. The above algorithms sometimes assume the presence of a central
node, or an underlying network structure such as a spanning tree [86, 75], and hence are not
applicable where the underlying network does not guarantee reliability or robustness. Haridasan
and van Renesse [65] proposed a gossip-based technique that allowed each node in a network
to estimate the distribution of values held by other nodes, but their results did not offer any
theoretical bounds.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 4.2, we state our system model and give a precise
definition of the problem. We first present the algorithm and analysis for the relative threshold
version in Section 4.3, and then the absolute threshold version in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 we
discuss the simulation results for both absolute and relative thresholds with an asynchronous
time model. In Section 4.6, we discuss the extension of these results to synchronous gossip.
4.2 Model
We consider a distributed system with N nodes numbered from 1 to N . The number of
nodes N is not necessarily known to any participating node, and this information is not used
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by the algorithms. An “item” is an integer from the set {1, 2, . . . ,m}. An “element” is a single
occurrence of an item at any node. Each node i holds a multiset of items Mi, or equivalently, a
set of elements. Let Ni denote the size of Mi. Let M = ⋃Ni=1Mi denote the set of all elements
in the network.
For item v ∈ [m], the frequency of v is denoted by fv, and is defined as the number
of occurrences of v in M . Note that fv may not be available locally at any node, in fact
determining fv itself requires a distributed computation. The task is to identify those items v
such that fv is large. Let the total number of elements be defined as N = ∑Ni=1Ni.
We consider the scenario of uniform gossip, which is the most commonly used model of
gossip. Whenever a node i is chosen to transmit, it chooses the destination of its message to
be a node selected uniformly at random from among all the current nodes in the system. The
selection of the transmitting node is done by the distributed scheduler, described later in this
section. We assume that the participating nodes execute the algorithms faithfully, and do not
maliciously attempt to influence the results of the computation by sending spurious/incorrect
messages.
Problem Definition. We consider two variants of the problem, depending on how the
thresholds are defined.
• Relative Threshold. The user may be interested in identifying items whose relative
frequency in the data set exceeds a given threshold. More precisely, given a relative
threshold φ (0 < φ < 1), approximation error ψ (0 < ψ < φ), an item v is considered to
be a frequent item if fv ≥ φN , and v is considered an infrequent item if fv < (φ− ψ)N .
According to this definition, there may be no more than 1/φ frequent items.
• Absolute Threshold. The user gives an absolute frequency threshold k > 1 and ap-
proximation error λ (λ < k). An item v is considered a frequent item if fv ≥ k, and v
is an infrequent item if fv < k − λ. Note that there may be up to N/k frequent items
according to this definition.
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In a centralized setting, when all elements are being observed at the same location, the above
formulations of relative and absolute thresholds are equivalent, since the number of elements N
can be computed easily, and any absolute threshold can be converted into a relative threshold,
or vice versa. However, in a distributed setting, a threshold for relative frequency cannot be
locally converted by a node into a threshold on the absolute frequency, since the user in a large
distributed system may not know the number of nodes or the number of elements in the system
accurately enough. Thus, we treat these two problems separately. The lack of knowledge of the
network size N does not, though, prevent the system from choosing gossip partners uniformly
at random. For example, Gkantsidis et al. [60] show how random walks can provide a good
approximation to uniform sampling for networks where the gap between the first and the second
eigenvalues of the transition matrix is constant.
Once the gossip has continued for long enough, the following probabilistic guarantees must
hold, whether for absolute or relative thresholds. Let δ be a user-provided bound on the error
probability (0 < δ < 1).
• With probability at least (1− δ), every node reports every frequent item.
• With probability at least (1− δ), no node reports an infrequent item.
Note that we present randomized algorithms, where the probabilistic guarantees hold irre-
spective of the input.
Time Model. Time is divided into non-overlapping rounds. We consider two types of
models, asynchronous and synchronous, depending on whether or not the nodes proceed at the
same rate.
• In the asynchronous model, in each round, a single source node, chosen uniformly at
random out of all N nodes, transmits to another randomly chosen receiver. Thus, in each
round in the asynchronous model, there is only one message.
• In the synchronous model of communication, in each round, every node in the network
sends a message to a receiver chosen uniformly at random from among all nodes. Thus,
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in a single round of synchronous communication, N messages are exchanged among the
nodes.
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we mostly focus on the asynchronous model. We discuss the
extension of our results to the synchronous model in Section 4.6.
Performance Metrics. We evaluate the quality of our protocols via the following met-
rics: the convergence time, which is defined as the number of rounds of gossip till convergence,
and the communication complexity, which is defined as the number of bytes exchanged till
convergence.
4.3 Frequent Items with Relative Threshold
Given thresholds φ and ψ, where ψ < φ, the goal is to identify all items v such that fv ≥ φN
and no item u such that fu < (φ− ψ)N .
We first describe the intuition. Our algorithm is based on random sampling. The idea is
that if an item occurs frequently in the original data, it is likely to occur at approximately
the same relative frequency in an appropriately sized random sample too. Hence, if we choose
those items which have occurred frequently in the random sample, we are likely to choose the
frequent items in the input also. To give guaranteed accuracy, we need a large enough sampling
probability. However, this sampling probability cannot be decided in advance since the size of
the dataset is not known beforehand. Hence, our algorithm works with an adaptive sampling
probability, based on the idea of min-wise independent permutations [23]. For i ∈ [N ] and
` ∈ [Ni], let the tuple (i, `) denote the `th element within Mi. Thus the tuple (i, `) uniquely
identifies an element within M , by first identifying a node id i, and then an element within Mi.
Let m`i denote the value of element (i, `). The algorithm assigns each element (i, `) a weight
w`i , which is a random number in the unit interval (0, 1).
The algorithm maintains a sketch S of (i, `,m`i , w
`
i ) tuples where (i, `) identifies the element,
m`i is the value of the element, and w
`
i is the weight. The sketch has no more than t elements,
and only the tuples that have the smallest weights are included in S. The intuition is that if
an item v has a large relative frequency, then v must occur frequently among the tuples with
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the t smallest weights, and hence in the sketch. Maintaining these t elements with the smallest
weights through gossip is easy, just as it is easy to maintain the smallest weight element through
gossip. If we choose a large enough sketch size t, the likelihood of a frequent item appearing in
the sketch a sufficient number of times is very high.
The algorithm for the asynchronous model is described in Figure 1. The threshold t is
determined through the analysis to be O( 1
ψ2
ln(1δ )). There are three parts to this algorithm
(and all others that we describe). The first part is the Initialization, where each node initializes
its own sketch. The next part is the Gossip, where the nodes exchange sketches with each other
according to the communication model. The algorithm only describes what happens during
each round of gossip – it is implicit that such computations repeat forever. The third part is
the Query, where a query for frequent items is answered using the sketch. The accuracy of the
result improves as further rounds of gossip occur.
The sketch at any node can be stored by any data structure that implements an associative
array with keys in a sorted order, the key here being w`i , and the value being a combination of
the other three. In our simulation, we created a Java object of class Tuple with (i, `,m`i , w
`
i ),
and each node maintains the sketch as a TreeSet collection of these Tuple objects. The
TreeSet Java class allows to store the objects in a user-defined order, so we kept the objects
sorted as per the weight w`i . The sorting order was defined by a class called WeightComparator,
which implements the Comparator interface of Java. When two sketches (TreeSet objects) were
merged in our simulation, the TreeSet class ensured that when an object is added to the sketch
of the local node, the user-defined ordering on weights was preserved. The implementation of
the TreeSet class ensures that the time taken to add, remove or check the existence of an item
to a TreeSet collection is logarithmic in the number of objects in the collection. After merging
two sketches, we checked whether the total number of objects exceeded the maximum size of
the sketch (t), and if it did, we created a SortedSet object with the t objects with the lowest
weights, and re-initialized the TreeSet object (the sketch) with this SortedSet object.
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Algorithm 11: Gossip algorithm at node i for finding the frequently occurring items with a
relative threshold
Input: Data sets Mi; error probability δ, relative frequency threshold φ, approximation
error ψ < φ
// Initialization
1 t← 128
ψ2
ln(3δ )
2 Si ← Φ
3 foreach ` = 1 to Ni do
4 Choose w`i as a uniformly distributed random number in (0, 1)
5 Set Si ← Si ∪ {(i, `,m`i , w`i )}
6 end
// Gossip
7 foreach round of gossip do
8 if sketch Sj is received from node j then
9 Si ← Si ∪ Sj
10 if |Si| > t then
11 retain t elements of Si with the smallest weights
12 end
13 end
14 if node i is selected to transmit then
15 select node j uniformly at random
16 send Si to j
17 end
18 end
// Query
19 when queried for the frequent items
20 foreach v ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
21 if at least (φ− ψ2 )t (nodeID, elementID, value, weight) tuples exist in Si with value v
then
22 report v as a frequent item
23 end
24 end
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4.3.1 Analysis
Let W denote the multi-set of weights ⋃Ni=1⋃Ni`=1{w`i}. Clearly, N = |W|. Let τ denote the
tth smallest element in W. Let M t be the set of elements {(i, `)} such that the w`i ≤ τ , where
ties are broken arbitrarily. In other words, M t is the set of t input elements which have been
assigned the smallest weights.
The analysis can be divided into two parts. We first show that with high probability, each
frequent item occurs with a sufficient frequency in M t. Similarly, with high probability, the
frequency in M t of each infrequent item is small. As a result, if the sketch at a node equals M t,
then it can identify frequent items with a low probability of a false positive or a false negative.
Note that this portion of the analysis is purely local, and has not yet dealt with the distributed
algorithm directly.
Next we analyze the distributed gossip process, and prove that with high probability, the
set M t is disseminated to all nodes within O(N logN) rounds. Combining the analysis of the
gossip with the results about false positives and false negatives, we obtain the main result about
the correctness of the algorithm, Theorem 4.3.1.
4.3.2 Analysis of M t
We first show that τ is sharply concentrated around tN .
Lemma 4.3.1 If t = 128
ψ2
ln(3δ ), then: (1) Pr[τ <
t
N (1− ψ4 )] < δ3 and (2) Pr[τ > tN (1+ ψ4 )] < δ3
Proof: Let X be a random variable equal to the number of elements in W that are less than
t
N (1 − ψ4 ). Since the weights are chosen independently of each other, X follows a binomial
distribution with N trials and probability of success in each trial tN (1− ψ4 ). This gives E[X] =
t(1− ψ4 ). Using Chernoff bounds, we get
Pr[τ <
t
N (1−
ψ
4
)] = Pr[X ≥ t] = Pr
[
X ≥ E[X]
(
1
1− ψ4
)]
≤ Pr
[
X ≥ E[X](1 + ψ
4
)
]
[since 1
1−ψ
4
> 1 + ψ4 ]
≤ e−E[X]ψ
2
48 = e−
t(1−ψ4 )ψ
2
48 (4.1)
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Using t = 128
ψ2
ln
(
3
δ
)
,
t(1− ψ4 )ψ2
48
=
8
3
ln
(
3
δ
)
(1− ψ
4
) ≥ ln
(
3
δ
)
(4.2)
Note that 83(1− ψ4 ) ≥ 1 since ψ ≤ 1. Substituting (4.2) in (4.1) yields:
Pr[τ <
t
N (1−
ψ
4
)] ≤ e− ln( 3δ ) = δ
3
which completes the proof of the first part.
For the second part, let Y be a random variable equal to the number of elements in W
that are less than tN (1 +
ψ
4 ). Y follows a binomial distribution with N trials and probability
of success in each trial equal to tN (1 +
ψ
4 ). This gives E[Y ] = t(1 +
ψ
4 ).
Pr
[
τ >
t
N
(
1 +
ψ
4
)]
= Pr[Y < t] = Pr
[
Y < E[Y ]
(
1
1 + ψ4
)]
Note that 1
1+ψ
4
≤ 1− ψ8 since (1 + ψ4 )(1− ψ8 ) = 1 + ψ8 − ψ
2
32 ≥ 1. This yields
Pr
[
Y < E[Y ]
(
1
1 + ψ4
)]
≤ Pr
[
Y < E[Y ]
(
1− ψ
8
)]
≤ e−E[Y ]ψ
2
64
( 1
2
) [Chernoff bound]
Substituting t = 128
ψ2
ln
(
3
δ
)
, we get:
E[Y ]ψ2
64
= t(1 +
ψ
4
)
ψ2
64
=
128
64
ln(
3
δ
)(1 +
ψ
4
) ≥ 2 ln(3
δ
)
Thus,
Pr
[
τ >
t
N
(
1 +
ψ
4
)]
≤ e− ln( 3δ ) = δ
3
We next prove results about the false negatives and false positives. In order to do so, we
need the following corollaries of the Chernoff bound. Let X be any binomial random variable,
i.e. X =
∑n
i=1Xi where the Xi are independent 0-1 random variables. The common form
of the Chernoff bound expresses the tail probabilities of X as a function of the expectation
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µ = E[X]. In our cases, E[X] is not known exactly, but a range [µL, µH ] is known such that
µL ≤ µ ≤ µH . In such a case, the following inequalities are useful.
Lemma 4.3.2 For any 0 < δ ≤ 1,
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µH ] ≤ exp
(
−µHδ2
3
)
Proof: Let MX(γ) be the moment generating function of X.
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µH ] = Pr[eγX ≥ eγ(1+δ)µH ] for any γ > 0
≤ E[e
γX ]
eγ(1+δ)µH
[by Markov inequality]
=
MX(γ)
eγ(1+δ)µH
≤ e
(eγ−1)µ
eγ(1+δ)µH
[since MX(γ) ≤ e(eγ−1)µ, as proved in [90], page 64]
≤ e
(eγ−1)µH
eγ(1+δ)µH
[since µH ≥ µ, and γ > 0⇒ (eγ − 1) > 0⇒ e(eγ−1) > 1]
Substituting γ = ln(1 + δ) > 0, we get (for any δ > 0),
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µH ] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
)µH
(4.3)
It is proved in [90], page 65, that for any 0 < δ ≤ 1,
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
≤ exp
(
−δ2
3
)
Combining this with inequality 4.3, the claim follows.
Lemma 4.3.3 For any 0 < δ < 1,
Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µL] ≤ exp
(
−µLδ2
2
)
Proof:
Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µL] = Pr[eγX ≥ eγ(1−δ)µL ] for any γ < 0
≤ E[e
γX ]
eγ(1−δ)µL
[by Markov inequality]
=
MX(γ)
eγ(1−δ)µL
[MX(γ) is the moment generating function of X]
≤ e
(eγ−1)µ
eγ(1−δ)µL
[since MX(γ) ≤ e(eγ−1)µ]
≤ e
(eγ−1)µL
eγ(1−δ)µL
[since µL ≤ µ, and γ < 0⇒ (eγ − 1) < 0⇒ 0 < e(eγ−1) < 1]
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Substituting γ = ln(1− δ) < 0, we get, for any 0 < δ < 1,
Pr[X ≤ (1− δ)µL] ≤
(
e−δ
(1− δ)(1−δ)
)µL
(4.4)
It is proved in [90], page 66, that for any 0 ≤ δ < 1,
e−δ
(1− δ)(1−δ) ≤ exp
(
δ2
2
)
Combining this with inequality 4.4, the claim follows.
The following lemmas provide upper bounds on the probabilities of finding a false negative
and a false positive respectively, in a centralized setting.
Lemma 4.3.4 If v is a frequent item, i.e. fv ≥ φN , then with probability at least 1 − δ, v
occurs at least (φ− ψ2 )t times in M t.
Proof: Let E1 be the event that v occurs at least (φ− ψ2 )t times in M t. Let E2 be the event
τ ≥ tN (1 − ψ4 ). Let Z be a random variable indicating the number of copies of v with weight
t
N (1 − ψ4 ) or smaller. Let E3 be the event that Z ≥ (φ − ψ2 )t. We observe that if E2 and E3
are true, then E1 is also true. From Lemma 4.3.1, we know that Pr[E¯2] < δ3 . Using these:
Pr[E1] ≥ Pr[E2 ∧ E3] = 1− Pr[E¯2 ∨ E¯3]
≥ 1− Pr[E¯2]− Pr[E¯3] ≥ 1− δ3 − Pr
[
Z <
(
φ− ψ
2
)
t
]
(4.5)
To estimate Pr
[
Z <
(
φ− ψ2
)
t
]
, note that Z follows a binomial distribution with φN or
more trials and a probability of success of tN (1− ψ4 ). This makes
E[Z] ≥ (φN )
(
t
N
(
1− ψ
4
))
= φt
(
1− ψ
4
)
≥
(
φ− ψ
4
)
t
Applying Lemma 4.3.3 with µL = (φ− ψ4 )t (note that µ = E[Z] ≥ µL), we get
Pr
[
Z <
(
φ− ψ
2
)
t
]
= Pr
[
Z <
(
φ− ψ
4
)
t
(
1− ψ
4φ− ψ
)]
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≤ exp
−(φ− ψ4 )t( ψ4φ−ψ )2
2

≤ exp
(−4 ln(3δ )
φ− ψ4
)
[Substituting t = 128
ψ2
ln(3δ )]
< exp
(
−4 ln(3
δ
)
)
[Since 0 < φ− ψ4 < 1]
=
(
δ
3
)4
(4.6)
Substituting (4.6) in (4.5):
Pr[E1] ≥ 1− δ3 −
(
δ
3
)4
≥ 1− δ
Lemma 4.3.5 If u is an infrequent item, i.e. fu < (φ − ψ)N , then, with probability at least
1− δ, u occurs less than (φ− ψ2 )t times in M t.
Proof: Let Y denote the number of copies of u with weight ≤ tN (1 + ψ4 ). Let E denote the
event that u occurs less than (φ − ψ2 )t times in M t. As in the proof of Lemma 4.3.4, using
Lemma 4.3.1, we get:
Pr[E] ≥ Pr
[(
τ ≤ tN
(
1 +
ψ
4
))
∧
(
Y ≤
(
φ− ψ
2
)
t
)]
≥ 1− Pr
[
τ >
t
N
(
1 +
ψ
4
)]
− Pr
[
Y >
(
φ− ψ
2
)
t
]
≥ 1− δ
3
− Pr
[
Y >
(
φ− ψ
2
)
t
]
(4.7)
To estimate Pr
[
Y >
(
φ− ψ2
)
t
]
, note that Y follows a binomial distribution with (φ−ψ)N
or less trials and a probability of success of tN (1 +
ψ
4 ). Thus,
E[Y ] ≤ (φ− ψ)N
(
t
N
(
1 +
ψ
4
))
≤ t
[
φ− 3ψ
4
− ψ
2
4
]
≤ t
[
φ− 3ψ
4
]
Applying Lemma 4.3.2 with µH = (φ− 3ψ4 )t (note that µ = E[Z] ≤ µH), we get
Pr
[
Y >
(
φ− ψ
2
)
t
]
= Pr
[
Y >
(
φ− 3ψ
4
)
t
(
1 +
ψ
4φ− 3ψ
)]
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≤ exp
−(φ− 3ψ4 )t( ψ4φ−3ψ )2
3

≤ exp
( −8 ln(3δ )
3(φ− 3ψ4 )
)
[Substituting t = 128
ψ2
ln(3δ )]
< exp
(
−8
3
ln
(
3
δ
))
[Since 0 < φ− 3ψ4 < 1]
=
(
δ
3
) 8
3
(4.8)
Substituting (4.8) in (4.7), we get
Pr[E] ≥ 1− δ
3
−
(
δ
3
) 8
3 ≥ 1− δ
4.3.3 Analysis of Gossip.
Consider an item θ that is disseminated through gossip in the asynchronous model. At the
start, θ is with one node, and in subsequent rounds it is disseminated to the other nodes. Let
TN be the number of rounds till θ is disseminated to all the N nodes.
Lemma 4.3.6 E[TN ] = 2N lnN +O(N).
Proof: Let ξi be the set of nodes that have θ after i rounds. Thus ξ0 has only one node (the
one that sampled θ during the initialization step). For j = 1 . . . N − 1, let random variable Xj
be the number of rounds required to increase the number of nodes that have θ from j to j + 1.
TN =
N−1∑
j=1
Xj
For i ≥ 1, in round i, a new node receives θ if a gossip message is transmitted from node
α to node β where α ∈ ξi−1 and β 6∈ ξi−1. Thus Xj is a geometric random variable, i.e. the
number of trials till the first “success”, where a success is defined as a message from node
α ∈ ξi−1 to a node β 6∈ ξi−1. The probability of a success is thus
(
j
N
) (
1− jN
)
= j(N−j)
N2
. A
geometric random with probability of success p has expectation 1/p, so we get E[Xj ] = N
2
j(N−j) .
Using linearity of expectation, we get:
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E[TN ] =
N−1∑
j=1
E[Xj ] =
N−1∑
j=1
N2
j(N − j) = N
N−1∑
j=1
(
1
j
+
1
N − j
)
= 2N
N−1∑
j=1
1
j
= 2NHN−1 = 2N lnN +O(N)
where Hk denotes the kth Harmonic number.
Our proof for high-probability bounds on TN uses a result about the coupon collector
problem. Suppose there are coupons of Λ distinct types, labeled {1, 2, . . . ,Λ}, and one has to
draw coupons at random (with replacement) until at least one coupon of each type has been
collected. Initially, it is very easy to select a type not yet chosen, but as more and more types
get chosen, it becomes increasingly difficult to get a coupon of a type not yet chosen. We
present a high probability bound on the number of trials to collect all Λ coupons.
Lemma 4.3.7 Let the random variable CΛ denote the number of trials to collect at least one
coupon of each of Λ types. Then,
Pr[CΛ > 3Λ ln Λ] ≤ 1Λ2
Proof: Let Ei denote the event that the coupon with label i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Λ} did not get drawn
at all in 3Λ ln Λ trials. Then,
Pr[CΛ > 3Λ ln Λ] = Pr
(
Λ⋃
i=1
Ei
)
≤
Λ∑
i=1
Pr(Ei) (union bound)
=
Λ∑
i=1
(
1− 1
Λ
)3Λ ln Λ
≤
Λ∑
i=1
(
e−
1
Λ
)3Λ ln Λ ≤ Λ∑
i=1
1
Λ3
=
1
Λ2
Lemma 4.3.8
Pr[TN > 12N ln 2N ] ≤ 1
2N2
Proof: The dissemination of θ can be divided into two phases. The first phase starts with
the first transmission and continues until the object has reached N2 distinct nodes. The second
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phase starts once it has reached N2 nodes and continues until it reaches N nodes. Note that,
in the first phase, it is more unlikely to find a source node that has θ and it is easy to find a
destination that does not have θ. Once θ has reached N2 nodes, the situation reverses. Let T1
and T2 be the number of rounds taken by the two phases, respectively.
More formally, let Xj be defined as in the proof of Lemma 4.3.6. Let T1 =
∑N/2
j=1 Xj , and
T2 =
∑N−1
j=N
2
+1
Xj . Clearly, we have TN = T1 + T2.
To bound TN , we note that if TN > 12N ln 2N , then at least one of T1 or T2 should be
greater than 6N ln 2N . In Lemma 4.3.9, we show that T1 and T2 are bounded by 6N ln 2N ,
with high probability. Thus,
Pr[TN > 12N ln 2N ] ≤ Pr[(T1 > 6N ln 2N) ∪ (T2 > 6N ln 2N)]
≤ Pr[T1 > 6N ln 2N ] + Pr[T2 > 6N ln 2N ] (union bound)
≤ 1
4N2
+
1
4N2
(Lemma 4.3.9)
=
1
2N2
Lemma 4.3.9
Pr[T1 > 6N ln 2N ] ≤ 14N2
Pr[T2 > 6N ln 2N ] ≤ 14N2
Proof: For 0 < p ≤ 1, let G(p) denote a geometric random variable with parameter p. From
the proof of Lemma 4.3.6, we know that Xj = G
(
j(N−j)
N2
)
. Thus, T1 is the sum of independent
geometric random variables.
T1 =
N/2∑
j=1
G
(
j(N − j)
N2
)
Consider the random variable C2N , the number of trials needed to collect 2N coupons.
C2N =
2N∑
j=1
G
(
2N − j + 1
2N
)
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Let random variable C′ consist of the last few terms of C2N :
C′ =
N/2∑
j=1
G
(
j
2N
)
Note that for j = 1 . . . N/2, we have (N − j) ≥ N2 , and hence j(N−j)N2 ≥ j2N . Thus we can
write C′ and T1 as follows:
C′ =
N/2∑
j=1
G(yj)
T1 =
N/2∑
j=1
G(xj)
such that xj ≥ yj , for all j = 1, . . . , N2 . We also know that if 0 < y ≤ x ≤ 1, then for
any γ > 0, Pr[G(y) ≥ γ] ≥ Pr[G(x) ≥ γ]. From Lemma 4.3.10, we have that C′ stochastically
dominates T1, i.e. for each γ ≥ 0, Pr[C′ ≥ γ] ≥ Pr[T1 ≥ γ]. Since C2N ≥ C′, we have:
Pr[T1 > 6N ln 2N ] ≤ Pr[C′ > 6N ln 2N ] ≤ Pr[C2N > 6N ln 2N ] ≤ 14N2
where we have used Lemma 4.3.7. The proof for T2 follows similarly.
Lemma 4.3.10 Suppose Y and Z are random variables defined as follows. Y =
∑k
i=1 Yi, and
Z =
∑k
i=1 Zi, where the Yis are mutually independent, the Zis are mutually independent, and for
every i = 1 . . . k, Yi stochastically dominates Zi, i.e. for every γ ≥ 0, Pr[Yi ≥ γ] ≥ Pr[Zi ≥ γ].
Then, Y stochastically dominates Z, i.e. for each γ ≥ 0, Pr[Y ≥ γ] ≥ Pr[Z ≥ γ].
Proof: For i = 1 . . . k, let fi and gi be the cumulative distribution functions of Yi and Zi
respectively.
fi(γ) = Pr[Yi ≤ γ]
gi(γ) = Pr[Zi ≤ γ]
Consider any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. We know that for each γ ≥ 0, fi(γ) = 1 − Pr[Yi > γ] ≤
1− Pr[Zi > γ] = gi(γ). Thus, fi(γ) ≤ gi(γ).
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We can view Yi and Zi as random variables in the same sample space as follows. For
i = 1 . . . k, let Ui be a number chosen uniformly at random from (0, 1). Let random variables
Y
′
i = f
−1
i (Ui), and Z
′
i = g
−1
i (Ui). It is easy to see that for every outcome for Ui, f
−1
i (Ui) ≥
g−1i (Ui). Thus random variables Y
′
i and Z
′
i satisfy Y
′
i ≥ Z ′i. If the outcomes Ui, i = 1, . . . , k are
all independent, then the Y ′i s are mutually independent, and the Z ′is are mutually independent.
We observe that for every γ ≥ 0,
Pr[Y ′i ≤ γ] = Pr[f−1i (Ui) ≤ γ] = Pr[Ui ≤ fi(γ)] = fi(γ) = Pr[Yi ≤ γ]
Hence, Y ′i and Yi have identical distributions. Similarly, Z ′i and Zi have identical distribu-
tions. Now, consider Y ′ and Z ′ defined as follows:
Y ′ =
k∑
i=1
Y ′i
Z ′ =
k∑
i=1
Z ′i
Since the Y ′i s are mutually independent, Y ′ has the same distribution as Y , and similarly Z ′
has the same distribution as Z. Further, for each outcome in the above sample space, Y ′ ≥ Z ′.
This implies that for each γ ≥ 0, Pr[Y ≥ γ] ≥ Pr[Z ≥ γ].
We now present a bound on the dissemination time of the smallest weights. Let T t denote
the time taken for all items in M t to be disseminated to all nodes.
Lemma 4.3.11 Pr[T t > 12N ln 2N ] ≤ 12N .
Proof: For i = 1 . . . N , let M ti = Mi ∩M t i.e. the set of all elements at node i which have
been assigned weights among the smallest t weights. Note that in algorithm 11, all elements in
M ti are transmitted together, i.e., in each round, either all elements in M
t
i are transmitted, or
none of them are; thus, the upper bound on TN also applies to the dissemination time of M ti .
Let Ei denote the event that M ti is not disseminated to all nodes in 12N ln 2N rounds. From
Lemma 4.3.8, we have Pr[Ei] ≤ 12N2 .
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Pr[T t > 12N ln 2N ] = Pr
[
N⋃
i=1
Ei
]
≤
N∑
i=1
Pr[Ei] (union bound)
≤ N · 1
2N2
=
1
2N
We now present the main theorem on the correctness of algorithm 11.
Theorem 4.3.1 Suppose algorithm 11 is run for 12N ln 2N rounds. Then, with probability at
least 1− δ, an item of frequency φN or more in M will be identified as a frequent item at every
node. Similarly, with probability at least 1− δ, an item with frequency less than (φ− ψ)N will
not be identified as a frequent item at any node.
Proof: From Lemma 4.3.11, we have that all elements in M t are disseminated to every node
in the network after 12N ln 2N rounds. The theorem follows from Lemmas 4.3.5 and 4.3.4.
Since the size of the sketch at any time during gossip is at most t = 128
ψ2
ln(3δ ), the number
of bytes exchanged in each round is O( 1
ψ2
ln(1δ )). Hence, we get the following result on the
communication complexity, using Lemma 4.3.11.
Theorem 4.3.2 The number of bytes exchanged by algorithm 11 till the frequent items are
identified is at most O( 1
ψ2
ln(1δ )N lnN), with probability 1−O( 1N ).
4.4 Frequent Items with an Absolute Threshold
We now present an algorithm in the asynchronous model for identifying items whose fre-
quency is greater than a user-specified absolute threshold k. As in Section 4.3, let M =
⋃N
i=1Mi
denote the multi-set of all input values. The goal is to output all items v such that fv ≥ k
without outputting any item v such that fv < k − λ.
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The intuition is as follows. Similar to the algorithm for relative threshold, this algorithm is
based on random sampling. Unlike the algorithm for relative threshold, the sampling probabil-
ity can be statically decided by the nodes, based on k and λ. The elements of M are sampled
in a distributed manner, and the sampled elements are disseminated using gossip. Intuitively,
suppose we sample each element from M into a set S with probability 1/k. For a frequent item
v with fv ≥ k, we (roughly) expect one or more copies of v to be present in S. Similarly, for an
infrequent item u with fu < k−λ, we expect that no copy of u will be included in S. However,
some infrequent items may get “lucky” and may be included in S and similarly, some frequent
items may not make it to S. The probabilities of these events depend on the sample size.
To refine this sampling scheme, we sample with a probability that is slightly larger than
1/k, say c/k for some parameter c. Finally, we select those items that occur at least r times
within S, for some parameter r < c; the value of r will be determined by the analysis. The
smaller the value of λ, the greater should be the sampling probability, since we need to make
a more precise distinction between the frequencies of frequent and infrequent items. In the
actual algorithm, we use a sampling probability of 12k
λ2
ln 2δ – note that this is Ω(
1
k ) since λ < k
and hence k
λ2
> 1k .
The algorithm for the absolute threshold is shown as Algorithm 12. Through our analysis,
we give a bound on the number of rounds after which frequent items are likely to be found at
all nodes.
4.4.1 Analysis
We now analyze the correctness and the time complexity of algorithm 12. The plan is as
follows. Let M s be the set of elements in M that are sampled by the nodes, and hence get
disseminated through gossip. We first show in Lemma 4.4.1 that within a small number of
rounds, all elements in M s are disseminated to all nodes. We then show in Lemma 4.4.2 that
for each frequent item, M s contains sufficient copies of the item (with high probability), thus
showing that the probability of a false negative is small. Then, we show in Lemma 4.4.3 that
for each infrequent item, M s does not contain enough copies of the item to be identified as
a frequent item at any node (with high probability), showing that the probability of a false
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Algorithm 12: Gossip algorithm at node i for finding the frequently occurring items with
an absolute threshold k
Input: Data sets Mi; error probability δ, frequency threshold k, approximation error λ
// Initialization
1 Si ← Φ
2 foreach ` = 1 to Ni do
3 Choose ρ as a uniformly distributed random number in (0, 1)
4 if ρ < 12k
λ2
ln 2δ then
5 Si ← Si ∪ {(i, `,m`i)}
6 end
7 end
// Gossip
8 foreach round of gossip do
9 if sketch Sj is received from node j then
10 Si ← Si ∪ Sj
11 end
12 if node i is selected to transmit then
13 select node j uniformly at random from {1, . . . , N}
14 send Si to j
15 end
16 end
// Query
17 when queried for the frequent items
18 foreach v ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
19 if v occurs more than r = 12k
2
λ2
(1− λ2k ) ln 2δ times in Si then
20 report v as a frequent item
21 end
22 end
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positive is small. Let T s denote the time taken for all items in M s to be disseminated to all
nodes.
Lemma 4.4.1
Pr[T s > 12N ln 2N ] ≤ 1
2N
Proof: For a single element θ ∈ M s that gets disseminated through gossip, the results of
Lemmas 4.3.6 and 4.3.8 from the analysis for relative threshold hold, because the underlying
gossip mechanism is same for both the algorithms. For i = 1 . . . N , let M si = Mi ∩M s, i.e., the
set of all elements at node i which were sampled by node i, and hence included in the sketch at
node i when it was initialized. Note that in algorithm 12, all elements in M si are transmitted
together, i.e., in each round, either all the elements in M si are transmitted, or none of them
are. Thus, the upper bound on TN from Lemma 4.3.8 also applies to the dissemination time
of M si . Let Ei denote the event that M
s
i is not disseminated to all nodes in 12N ln 2N rounds.
From Lemma 4.3.8, we have Pr[Ei] ≤ 12N2 .
Pr[T s > 12N ln 2N ] = Pr
[
N⋃
i=1
Ei
]
≤
N∑
i=1
Pr[Ei]
≤ N · 1
2N2
=
1
2N
Lemma 4.4.2 False Negative. If v is an item with fv ≥ k, then with probability at least 1− δ,
v is returned as a frequent item by every node after 12N ln 2N rounds.
Proof: Let r = 12k
2
λ2
(1 − λ2k ) ln 2δ . If v is such that fv ≥ k, then v is not reported by a node
in the following two situations.
• Less than r copies of v are present in M s.
• r or more copies of v were sampled into M s during the initialization, but some copies did
not make it to all nodes during the gossip.
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Let E1 denote the event that less than r copies of v are present in M s. Let E2 denote
the event that after 12N ln 2N rounds, all of M s was not disseminated to all the nodes in the
network. Let E denote the event that there was some node that did not report v as a frequent
item.
Pr[E] ≤ Pr[E1 ∪ E2] ≤ Pr[E1] + Pr[E2] (4.9)
Consider some k copies of v in the input. Let Xv be a random variable that denotes the total
number of these k copies of v that are in M s. Xv is a binomial random variable with fv trials
and the probability of success in each trial being 12k
λ2
ln 2δ . It follows that E[Xv] =
12k2
λ2
ln 2δ .
Using Chernoff bounds:
Pr[E1] = Pr[Xv < r] = Pr
[
Xv <
12k2
λ2
(
1− λ
2k
)
ln
2
δ
]
= Pr
[
Xv < E[Xv]
(
1− λ
2k
)]
≤ e− 32 ln 2δ =
(
δ
2
) 3
2
<
δ
2
From Lemma 4.4.1, we have Pr[E2] < 1N . Using the bounds on Pr[E1] and Pr[E2] in
inequality 4.9, and assuming N > 2δ , we get:
Pr[E] ≤ δ
2
+
1
N
< δ
Lemma 4.4.3 False Positive. If u is an item with fu ≤ k − λ, where k 34 ≤ λ < k, then the
probability that u is returned by some node as a frequent item is no more than δ.
Proof: A false positive can occur if both these events happen (1)r or more copies of u are
present in M s; let E1 denote this event and (2)all r copies reach some node in the network
through gossip; let E2 denote this event. Let E denote the event that a false positive occurred.
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Pr[E] = Pr[E1 ∩ E2] ≤ Pr[E1]
Let Xu denote the number of copies of u that were sampled. Consider the “best case”
scenario for a false positive, when fu = k − λ. Then Xu is a binomial random variable with
E[Xu] = (k − λ)12kλ2 ln 2δ = 12k
2
λ2
(1− λk ) ln 2δ . Using Chernoff bounds:
Pr[E1] = Pr[Xu > r] = Pr
[
Xu >
12k2
λ2
(
1− λ
2k
)
ln
2
δ
]
= Pr
[
Xu > E[Xu]
(
1 +
λ
2k
1− λk
)]
≤ exp
(
−
(
ln
2
δ
)(
1
1− λk
))
=
(
δ
2
) 1
1−λ
k <
δ
2
[since 1
1−λ
k
> 1]
Lemmas 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.1 together lead to the following theorem about the correctness
of the algorithm.
Theorem 4.4.1 Suppose algorithm 12 is run for 12N ln 2N rounds. Then, with probability at
least 1 − δ, any item with k or more occurrences in M will be identified as a frequent item at
every node. With probability at least 1− δ, any item with less than k−λ occurrences in M will
not be identified as a frequent item at any node.
We next analyze the communication complexity of gossip. Since each node initializes its
sketch with the sampled elements, but accumulates more elements as the gossip proceeds, the
sizes of the messages exchanged grow as the algorithm progresses. We note that the number
of elements exchanged between two nodes in any round is no more than the total number of
sampled elements, hence, the number of rounds of gossip required, times the maximum message
size is an upper bound on the communication complexity. Let Y denote the total number of
bytes that need to be exchanged in the network until the frequent items have been identified.
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Theorem 4.4.2 (Communication Complexity for Absolute Threshold) With high prob-
ability, Y = O(NNk
λ2
ln 1δ lnN)
Proof: Let Z denote the number of elements sampled during initialization, i.e. Z = |M s|. Z
follows a binomial distribution with N trials, and probability of success in each trial equal to
12k
λ2
ln(2δ ). Thus E[Z] =
12Nk
λ2
ln(2δ ). Using Chernoff bounds:
Pr
[
Z >
18Nk
λ2
ln
(
2
δ
)]
= Pr
[
Z >
(
1 +
1
2
)
12Nk
λ2
ln
(
2
δ
)]
≤ e−Nkλ2 ln( 2δ ) =
(
δ
2
)Nk
λ2
<
δ
2
[since N > λ, k > λ]
We note that Z · T s is an upper bound on Y. Thus, if Y is large, then either Z must be
large, or T s must be large. More precisely, using the above bound on Z, and Lemma 4.4.1, we
get:
Pr
[
Y > 216NNk
λ2
ln
(
2
δ
)
ln 2N
]
≤ Pr
[(
Z >
18Nk
λ2
ln
(
2
δ
))⋃
(T s > 12N ln 2N)
]
≤ Pr
[
Z >
18Nk
λ2
ln
(
2
δ
)]
+ Pr [T s > 12N ln 2N ]
<
δ
2
+
1
2N
< δ
4.5 Simulation Results
We used simulation to understand the following aspects of the algorithms that we developed.
First, we wanted to know how easy it was to implement these algorithms. Next, since theoretical
analysis is a pessimistic worst case analysis, we can expect the performance observed during
simulation to be better than the theoretical predictions. We set out to measure by how much
is the measured performance better than the theoretical predictions. Specifically, we measured
the convergence time, and the error rate of the algorithm (these terms are described precisely
below).
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4.5.1 Input Data and Metrics Used.
We used two types of datasets for the simulations.
Data Set I: Pareto-like Distribution The first one was generated by a Pareto-like
distribution. Given the domain of items [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, to make the frequent algorithms
applicable, we needed a data distribution that can be made arbitrarily skewed, i.e., we wanted
n (n << m) of the data items from [m] to occur very frequently in the data set. During
generating the data, we kept a parameter to specify the number of frequent items. We made all
the frequent items equally probable, and the total probability of the frequent items was specified
by yet another parameter. For example, if we want the data to have 10 frequent items, and
the sum of the probabilities of these 10 items is 0.5, then the probability of generating each
of these 10 frequent items would be 0.05. Hence, if we have 5,000 nodes, and 100 elements
per node, then the expected number of occurrences of each item that we desire to be frequent
is 5000 × 100 × 0.05 = 25, 000. We tried three different dataset sizes: 500000, 1000000 and
1500000. For each dataset size, we generated 10 different datasets, and for each of these 10
different datasets (of the same size), we formed the sketch and gossiped it 10 times, to average
out the errors due to randomization. So each reading using this distribution (in Figures 4.2
and 4.3) is an average of 100 readings.
Dataset II: Zipfian+Uniform Distributions The second dataset was generated from
a mixture of Zipfian and uniform distributions. Once again, we fixed a small number (n)
of items from [m] that would be generated with high frequency. According to the Zipfian
distribution, the probability of the rth most frequent item (r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) was assigned by
the following probability mass function:
f(r) =
1
r∑n
i=1
1
i
The sum of the probabilities of these n frequent items was set to θ < 1. The remaining
m−n items from the domain [m] were all assigned equal probability (this is where the uniform
distribution came in), which was 1−θm−n . For each of the relative and absolute error algorithm,
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we worked with datasets of three different sizes: 500000, 1500000 and 4000000. To average out
the errors due to randomization, we created 100 different datasets of each size, and for each
dataset, we repeated the experiment 50 times, and averaged the error rate over these 5,000
runs; so each point in the plots in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 resulted from 5000 repetitions.
We analyze the convergence time and the error rates of the algorithms as functions of the
network size and message cost of the gossip, respectively.
4.5.2 Convergence Time
Informally, a system is defined to have converged if it is in a configuration where every
pair of nodes have “seen” each other’s sketch, either through direct or indirect communication.
More precisely, we define that for two nodes i and j, node i has communicated directly with
node j if i sent a message to j. We (recursively) define that node i has communicated indirectly
with node j if there exists a node k such that i has communicated directly/indirectly with k
and then k has communicated directly/indirectly with j.
Note that according to the above definition, system convergence is sufficient to ensure that
further communication will not lead to any changes in the state of the sketch at any node.
In Figure 4.1, we plot the number of rounds of gossip required for convergence as a function
of the network size N . Because the convergence time for uniform gossip depends only on the
network size, the same results apply for both absolute and relative thresholds. We note that
all sampled elements at a node are disseminated together. Hence, the convergence time is a
function only of the network size N , and does not depend on the size of the dataset, or on the
size of the samples.
Error Rate: Since the algorithm is a randomized approximation algorithm, there is a
small, but non-zero probability that the algorithm will fail, i.e. it would report infrequent
items as frequent (false positive) and/or would fail to identify frequent items (false negative).
The user specifies the degree of accuracy desired through the approximation error ψ (for relative
threshold) or λ (for absolute threshold) and the error probability δ.
We now describe the error rate metric that we used for measuring the observed error in our
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Figure 4.1: The number of rounds till convergence versus network size N .
experiments. Note that while the algorithm guarantees a low probability of error, we measure
the actual fraction of time that an error occurred during the simulations. The False Negative
Rate is defined as the ratio of the number of false negatives reported by a node to the number
of data items that are frequent, i.e., what fraction of the frequent items were not identified
as frequent by the node. The False Positive Rate is defined as the ratio of the number of
false positives reported by a node to the number of data items that are not frequent, but have
occurred at least once in the input. The Error Rate is defined as the maximum of the false
negative and the false positive rates. Since all nodes attain the same state once convergence
occurs, the error rate can be recorded from an arbitrarily selected node (we recorded it from
node 0). To see whether we really needed a sketch size as large as predicted by theory, we
measured the observed error rate at various sketch sizes.
For relative threshold, the theoretical sketch size was t = cr
ψ2
ln 3δ (with cr = 128 as revealed
by the analysis), so we tried sketch sizes for various values of the constant cr. Figures 4.2 and
4.4 show the error rates as a function of the sketch size, for the Pareto-like distribution and
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Figure 4.2: The error rate as a function of the sketch size for the relative error algorithm, with
the dataset genereated by the Pareto-like distribution. φ = 0.081, ψ = 0.02 and δ = 0.1.
the mixed distribution respectively.
For absolute threshold, the theoretical sampling probability was cak
λ2
ln 2δ (with ca = 12 as
revealed by the analysis), so we tried sketch sizes for various values of the constant ca. Figures
4.3 and 4.5 show the error rates as a function of ca, for different dataset sizes and correspond-
ing different values of k and λ, for the Pareto-like distribution and the mixed distribution
respectively.
4.5.3 Observations
We make the following observations from our experience with the simulations, and results
in Figures 4.1 to 4.5.
• The theoretical analysis predicted that for a system with N nodes, 12N ln 2N rounds
of gossip are sufficient for convergence, with high probability. By carrying out simula-
tions with upto 50,000 nodes, we found from simulations that convergence was typically
achieved with less than 2N lnN rounds of gossip for all the values of N that we tried (see
Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.3: The error rate as a function of ca, a multiplier in the sampling probability, for the
absolute error algorithm. The dataset is genereated by the Pareto-like distribution. Note that
the expected sketch size increases linearly with the sampling probability. δ = 0.1.
• For relative threshold, while the analysis showed that in the expression for the sketch
size cr
ψ2
ln 3δ , a constant factor cr = 128 is necessary, we found in our experiments that a
constant factor of cr = 0.25 was sufficient in all cases to meet the desired error bounds.
This indicates that in practice, the required sketch sizes may be much smaller than
predicted by theory.
• For absolute threshold, while the analysis showed that in the expression for the sampling
probability cak
λ2
ln 2δ , a constant factor ca = 12 is necessary, we found in our experiments
that a constant factor of ca = 2 was sufficient in all cases to meet the desired error bounds.
This indicates that in practice, the required sampling probability may be smaller than
predicted by theory.
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Figure 4.5: The error rate as a function of ca, a multiplier in the sampling probability, for the
absolute error algorithm. The dataset is genereated by the mixed distribution.
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4.6 Synchronous Model
In the synchronous communication model, all nodes transmit equally often. In each com-
munication round, every node can send a message to one other (randomly chosen) node. We
use a result due to Frieze and Grimmett [53], who considered the time to spread a rumor
in a network. In their model, there is a rumor message that has to spread to everyone in a
population of size N . Initially, a single person has the rumor. In every communication round,
each person who already has the rumor conveys it to another randomly chosen person in the
population, and we are interested in the number of rounds taken for the rumor to spread to all
N nodes. Note the similarity to our model of synchronous gossip.
Theorem 4.6.1 (Frieze and Grimmett 1985) Let TN denote the number of rounds re-
quired to spread a rumor among a population of size N . Then, (1) limN→∞ T
N
log2N
= ln 2
with high probability and, (2) For γ > 0,Pr[TN > (1 + (γ + 1) ln 2) log2N ] = o(N−γ)
Suppose that instead of a single rumor, there were α different rumors originating at different
nodes, and all these rumors were being disseminated simultaneously among the N nodes. Let
T α be the number of rounds required for all the nodes to receive all α rumors.
Lemma 4.6.1 With probability 1− o( 1N ), T α ≤ (1 + 2 ln 2) log2N + lnα.
Proof: For i = 1 . . . α, let ti denote the number of rounds required to disseminate rumor i.
Since all the α rumors are being disseminated simultaneously, we have T α = maxαi=1 ti. Using
the union bound:
Pr[T α > x] = Pr[
α⋃
i=1
(ti > x)] ≤
α∑
i=1
Pr[ti > x] = αPr[TN > x]
Using γ = 1 + logN α in Theorem 4.6.1, we get Pr[TN > (1 + 2 ln 2) log2N + lnα] = o(
1
Nα),
and the result follows.
Our algorithms for the synchronous time model for relative and absolute thresholds, are
described as Algorithms 13 and 14 respectively. These differ from the algorithms for the
asynchronous models (Algorithms 11 and 12) in that in every round of communication, every
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Algorithm 13: Synchronous gossip algorithm at node i for finding the frequent items with
a relative threshold
Input: Data sets Mi; error probability δ, relative frequency threshold φ, approximation
error ψ < φ
// Initialization
1 t← 128
ψ2
ln(3δ )
2 Si ← Φ
3 foreach ` = 1 to Ni do
4 Choose w`i as a uniformly distributed random number in (0, 1)
5 Set Si ← Si ∪ {(i, `,m`i , w`i )}
6 end
// Gossip
7 foreach round of gossip do
8 if sketch Sj is received from node j then
9 Si ← Si ∪ Sj
10 if |Si| > t then
11 retain t elements of Si with the smallest weights
12 end
13 end
14 select node j uniformly at random
15 send Si to j
16 end
// Query
17 when queried for the frequent items
18 foreach v ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
19 if at least (φ− ψ2 )t (nodeID, elementID, value, weight) tuples exist in Si with value v
then
20 report v as a frequent item
21 end
22 end
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Algorithm 14: Synchronous gossip algorithm at node i for frequent items with an absolute
threshold k
Input: Data sets Mi; error probability δ, frequency threshold k, approximation error λ
// Initialization
1 Si ← Φ
2 foreach ` = 1 to Ni do
3 Choose ρ as a uniformly distributed random number in (0, 1)
4 if ρ < 12k
λ2
ln 2δ then
5 Si ← Si ∪ {(i, `,m`i)}
6 end
7 end
// Gossip
8 foreach round of gossip do
9 if sketch Sj is received from node j then
10 Si ← Si ∪ Sj
11 end
12 select node j uniformly at random from {1, . . . , N}
13 send Si to j
14 end
// Query
15 when queried for the frequent items
16 foreach v ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
17 if v occurs more than r = 12k
2
λ2
(1− λ2k ) ln 2δ times in Si then
18 report v as a frequent item
19 end
20 end
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node sends a message. Note that the sampling probability, the sketch size and the thresholds for
identification of frequent items in the algorithms for the asynchronous model also suffice for the
synchronous model, so the analysis of the random sampling is the same as in the asynchronous
model. The only change is in the gossip mechanism. We arrive at the following result:
Theorem 4.6.2 (Synchronous gossip) If the synchronous algorithms 13 and 14 are run
for 4 log2N rounds, then all frequent items (with relative and absolute thresholds, respectively)
will be identified with probability at least 1 − δ, and no infrequent item will be identified, with
probability at least 1− δ.
Proof: Similar to the asynchronous time model, in the synchronous model too, the analysis
of gossip does not depend on how many elements each node begins with, or how many elements
from each node find a place in the sketch; since all the elements from the (local) sketch of a
single node get disseminated together. The number of such local sketches is trivially no more
than N . If all these items are disseminated to all nodes, then the guarantees will be met.
Substituting α ≤ N in Lemma 4.6.1 yields the desired result. We can get a slightly tighter
result (but asymptotically still the same) by using a better bound on the number of sampled
items.
Note that for both absolute and relative thresholds, the number of rounds required in the
synchronous model is less than that required by the asynchronous model by a factor of Θ(N)
– this is to be expected, since in each round in the asynchronous model, a single message is
exchanged while in each round in the asynchronous model, N messages are exchanged.
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